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Abstract
In this work, a class of information theoretic secrecy problems is addressed where the eavesdropper
channel states are completely unknown to the legitimate parties. In particular, MIMO wiretap channel
models are considered where the channel of the eavesdropper is arbitrarily varying over time. Assuming
that the number of antennas of the eavesdropper is limited, the secrecy rate of the MIMO wiretap channel
in the sense of strong secrecy is derived, and shown to match with the converse in secure degrees of
freedom. It is proved that there exists a universal coding scheme that secures the confidential message
against any sequence of channel states experienced by the eavesdropper. This yields the conclusion that
secure communication is possible regardless of the location or channel states of (potentially infinite
number of) eavesdroppers. Additionally, it is observed that, the present setting renders the secrecy
capacity problems for multi-terminal wiretap-type channels more tractable as compared the case with
full or partial knowledge of eavesdropper channel states. To demonstrate this observation, secure degrees
of freedom regions are derived for the Gaussian MIMO multiple access wiretap channel (MIMO MAC-
WT) and the Gaussian MIMO broadcast wiretap channel (MIMO BC-WT) where the transmitter(s) and
the intended receiver(s) have the same number of antennas.
Index terms: Information theoretic secrecy, MIMO wiretap channel, MIMO MAC wiretap channel, MIMO BC
wiretap channel, strong secrecy, eavesdroppers with unknown location.
This work is supported in part by the National Science Foundation via Grants CNS-0716325, CCF-0964362, and the DARPA
ITMANET Program via Grant W911NF-07-1-0028. This work will be presented in part at Allerton conference on communication,
control and computing, September, 2010, and the IEEE Global Telecommunications conference (Globecom), December, 2010.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Information theoretic secrecy dates back to the seminal work by Shannon [1], where it was
shown that if the eavesdropper had perfect knowledge of the signals sent by the transmitter and
had unbounded computational power, to achieve perfect secrecy, the transmitter and the receiver
would have to share a key whose rate equals that of the data.
Wyner, in [2], found that Shannon’s result was overly pessimistic, and showed that for the
wiretap channel, where the eavesdropper had a noisy observation of the signals sent by the
transmitter, a positive rate could be supported for transmitting confidential messages without
requiring the communicating parties to share a key. The model was generalized by Csisza´r and
Ko¨rner in [3].
The wiretap channel model in [2]–[4] has inspired considerable effort toward identifying
secure communication limits of various channel models, e.g. [5]–[16]. In these works, it is
assumed that the transmitter(s) has (have) perfect knowledge of the eavesdropper channel states,
which may be difficult to obtain in a practical system, since the eavesdropper is by nature a
passive entity. To resolve this issue, recent works attempt to relax this condition by assuming the
transmitter only has partial knowledge about the channel states of the eavesdropper. Notably,
this line of work includes the compound setting, where the eavesdropper channel can only
be taken from a finite selection [17]–[20], and the fading channel, where the transmitter only
knows the distribution of the eavesdropper channel [21]. These each call for different types of
codebook design. For example, in [17]–[19], the coding scheme depends on the possible channel
gains of the eavesdropper included in the finite set. For the fading setting [21], the duration of
communication needs to be able to accommodate a sufficient number of channel uses to ensure
that the ergodicity assumption is valid. In addition, the rate of the codebook depends on the fading
parameter of the eavesdropper, e.g., the variance of the Rayleigh distribution, and thus needs to
be acquired, which may be difficult to do with a passive malicious entity. Given the absence of a
robustness analysis toward understanding how sensitive the achievable secrecy rate is to errors in
the aforementioned modeling parameters in [17]–[19], [21], it is difficult to ascertain how close
these can model a realistic secure system design based on information theoretic guarantees.
The case where the eavesdropper’s location is not perfectly known was also considered in
the context of network coding. In [22], the eavesdropper is assumed to monitor no more than
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K edges in a network, while the locations of these edges can be arbitrary. The code designer
uses the fact that there are more than K routes connecting the sender and the receiver of the
confidential message, while the eavesdropper can not monitor all routes. The simple, yet powerful
insight offered by [22] on the merit of utilizing the advantage enjoyed by the legitimate nodes
via multiple routes, can be brought into the wireless setting by utilizing multiple antennas.
Specifically, if the intended receiver has more antennas than the eavesdropper, then even though
the eavesdropper can be anywhere, i.e., experience any channel state, it can not monitor all
antennas of the receiver.
Inspired by this observation, in this work, we study the MIMO wiretap channel, where the
number of antennas at the eavesdropper is limited. The channel state sequence of the eavesdropper
is assumed to be independent from the input and output of the wiretap channel. Conditioned on
any given sequence of channel states, we assume that the eavesdropper channel is memoryless.
No restriction is placed on the statistics of the channel model observed by the eavesdropper.
That is, the eavesdropper’s channel is totally unknown to the legitimate parties and can vary
arbitrarily over time.
The main contribution of this work is to prove the existence of a universal coding scheme
that secures the confidential message against any sequence of eavesdropper channel states for
the MIMO wiretap setting described above. This means the coding scheme could withstand the
presence of infinitely many eavesdroppers as long as they do not collude. The universal nature
of the coding scheme is what sets this work apart from the previous work that considered a
similar setting with fading [23]. Additionally, unlike [24] which considered the discrete arbitrarily
varying wiretap channel, this work considers a Gaussian setting which does not lend itself to a
direct extension from its discrete counterpart.
The achievable rates we prove in this work satisfy strong secrecy requirements [25]. It is well
accepted that weak secrecy is insufficient for practice [25]–[27]. However, it is often argued that
strong secrecy can be obtained from weak secrecy through privacy amplification, as shown in
[25]. We shall show that, in the setting considered in this paper, this is not the case. Therefore,
not only we provide the proof of weak secrecy, but a direct proof of strong secrecy as well,
which yields the same achievable rate as its weak counterpart.
The achieved rate derived in this work is tight in terms of secure degrees of freedom (s.d.o.f.),
which is a high SNR characteristic of the secrecy capacity.
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We also extend our results to a MIMO MAC wiretap channel (MIMO MAC-WT) and a
MIMO Broadcast wiretap channel (MIMO BC-WT), for the case where legitimate transmitter(s)
and receiver(s) have the same number of antennas, and identify their secure degrees of freedom
region. It is interesting to note that, in the seemingly simpler setting where the eavesdropper’s
channel is perfectly known to the legitimate parties, the secure degrees of freedom region for
the MIMO MAC-WT channel remains an open problem [19], [28], [29].
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The system models are introduced in
Section II. In Section III, we state the main results, which are proved in Sections IV and V.
Section VI presents a discussion on strong secrecy as well as a detailed comparison to related
work. Section VII concludes the paper.
II. SYSTEM MODELS
A. The (NT , NR, NE) MIMO Wiretap Channel
The channel from the transmitter to the intended receiver, i.e., the main channel, is assumed
to be static. Let A(i) denote the value of the signal A during the ith channel use. The input and
output of the main channel during the ith channel use are related as:
YNR×1(i) = HNR×NTXNT×1(i) + ZNR×1(i) (1)
where the subscripts denote the dimension of each term. H denotes the NR×NT channel matrix
with complex entries1. It is assumed that H has full rank. Z is a NR× 1 vector representing the
additive noise. Z is composed of independent rotationally invariant complex Gaussian random
variables, each with zero mean and unit variance. X and Y are the transmitted and received
signals respectively.
The channel from the transmitter to the eavesdropper, i.e., the eavesdropper channel, is an
arbitrarily varying channel. It can be expressed as:
Y˜NE×1(i) = H˜NE×NT (i)XNT×1(i) (2)
where Y˜(i) denotes the signals received by the eavesdropper during the ith channel use. H˜NE×NT (i)
is the channel state matrix for the eavesdropper channel during the ith channel use. We use H˜n
1Since we assume that the main channel is static, H remains fixed for all channel uses.
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to denote H˜(1), ..., H˜(n). H˜n is not known at the legitimate parties. We also assume H˜n is
independent from Xn.
Note that we assume the eavesdropper’s channel is noiseless. This is obviously a worst case
assumption, and if the eavesdropper’s signals are corrupted by additive noise, they can always
be considered as a degraded version of the signals received by the eavesdropper considered in
this work.
Let W denote the confidential message transmitted to the intended receiver, over n channel
uses using Xn. In addition, we assume that there is a local random source M which is only
known to the transmitter. Xn is computed by the transmitter from W and M using the following
encoding function fn:
X
n = fn(W,M) (3)
Note that fn does not depend on H˜, since the transmitter does not know the channel state of
the eavesdropper.
We represent Xn as a NT × n matrix, with the average power constraint2
lim
n→∞
1
n
trace(Xn(Xn)H) ≤ P¯ . (4)
Let Wˆ denote the decoder output of the intended receiver from Yn. Then we require
lim
n→∞
Pr(W 6= Wˆ ) = 0 (5)
for reliable communication. Additionally, we require the following strong secrecy constraint [25]
to hold for any distribution of H˜n.
lim
n→∞
I(W ; Y˜n, H˜n) = 0 (6)
When designing the encoder fn, we need a uniform bound on I(W ; Y˜n, H˜n) over all possible
distributions of eavesdropper channel state sequences for a given n, which will determine the
minimal codeword length required to achieve a certain level of secrecy. Hence, it is important
for the convergence in (6) to be uniform for all possible statistics of the eavesdropper channel
state sequence.
2trace denotes the sum of the diagonal elements of a square matrix.
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Fig. 1. The MIMO Wiretap Channel.
Since H˜n is independent from Xn, (6) can be written as:
lim
n→∞
I(W ; Y˜n|H˜n) = 0 (7)
On the other hand, since we do not want the secrecy constraint to rely on the distribution of
H˜
n
, we require that for any given sequence h˜n,
lim
n→∞
I(W ; Y˜n|H˜n = h˜n) = 0. (8)
In the sequel, to simplify the notation, we use a scalar γ to index the sequence h˜n and use Y˜nγ
to represent the random variable Y˜n when H˜n equals the sequence h˜n indexed by γ. Then (8)
can be written as:
lim
n→∞
I(W ; Y˜nγ ) = 0, ∀γ (9)
Secrecy rate Rs
Rs = lim
n→∞
1
n
H(W ) (10)
for the MIMO wiretap channel is said to be achievable if for each n there exists a fixed encoding
function fn as defined by (3), such that for any given the eavesdropper channel H˜, (5), (9), (4)
and (10) holds for Rs. The supremum of all possible values for Rs is the secrecy capacity of
this channel model.
The high SNR behavior of the secrecy rate is characterized by the secure degrees of freedom
defined as:
s.d.o.f. = lim sup
P¯→∞
Rs
log2
(
P¯
) (11)
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Eavesdropper
P¯2
T1
RW1
Wˆ1
Wˆ2
X1
P¯1
Y
X2
E
Y˜
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W2
NT antennas NT antennas
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T2W2
Fig. 2. The (NT , NT , NT , NE) MIMO MAC wiretap channel where legitimate nodes have NT = 2 antennas each, and the
eavesdropper has NE = 1 antenna.
We use the term the secure degrees of freedom of a channel to represent the largest possible
value of secure degrees of freedom.
B. The (NT , NT , NT , NE) MIMO MAC Wiretap Channel
We also consider the MIMO MAC wiretap channel, an example of which is shown in Fig-
ure 2. We assume each transmitter has NT antennas. The receiver also has NT antennas. The
eavesdropper has NE antennas. During the ith channel use, the channel is defined as:
Y(i) =
2∑
k=1
HkXk(i) + Z(i) (12)
Y˜(i) =
2∑
k=1
H˜k(i)Xk(i) (13)
where Hk, k = 1, 2 and H˜k(i), k = 1, 2 are channel matrices. Z is the additive Gaussian noise
observed by the intended receiver, which has the same distribution as the Z in (1). H˜k(i), k = 1, 2
are not known to the legitimate parties. The sequence {H˜k(i), k = 1, 2} are independent from
the value of Xk, k = 1, 2 over n channel uses. Hk, k = 1, 2 are known by both the legitimate
parties and the eavesdropper(s).
User k wishes to transmit a confidential message Wk to the receiver over n channel uses, while
both messages must be kept confidential from the eavesdropper. We use γ to index a specific
sequence of {H˜k(i), k = 1, 2} over n channel uses and use Y˜nγ to represent the corresponding
channel outputs for Y˜n. The secrecy constraint is:
lim
n→∞
I
(
W1,W2; Y˜
n
γ
)
= 0, ∀γ (14)
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Again, we stress that the convergence of the limit in (14) must be uniform over all possible
sequences of the eavesdropper channel states.
The average power constraints for the two users are given by
lim
n→∞
1
n
trace(Xnk(X
n
k)
H) ≤ P¯k, k = 1, 2 (15)
The secrecy rate for k, Rs,k, is defined as
Rs,k = lim
n→∞
1
n
H(Wk), k = 1, 2 (16)
such that Wk can be reliably decoded by the receiver, and (14) and (15) are satisfied.
We define the secure degrees of freedom region similar to [30]: We assume P¯k = P¯ , k = 1, 2.
The secure degrees of freedom region is defined as:
{(d1, d2) : dk = lim sup
P¯→∞
Rs,k
log2 P¯
, k = 1, 2} (17)
C. The (NT , NT , NT , NE) MIMO Broadcast Wiretap Channel
Similarly, we can consider a MIMO Broadcast (BC) wiretap channel shown in Figure 3. We
assume that the transmitter has NT antennas, as well as each receiver. The eavesdropper has NE
antennas. During the ith channel use, the channel is defined as:
Yk(i) = HkX(i) + Zk(i), k = 1, 2 (18)
Y˜(i) = H˜(i)X(i) (19)
where Hk, k = 1, 2 and H˜(i) are the channel matrices. Zk, k = 1, 2 is the additive Gaussian
noise observed by the intended receivers, which has the same distribution as the Z in (1). H˜(i)
is unknown to the legitimate parties. Hk, k = 1, 2 are known by both the legitimate parties and
the eavesdropper(s).
Each receiver k receives a confidential message Wk from the transmitter over n channel uses,
while both messages must be kept confidential from the eavesdropper. The secrecy constraint is:
lim
n→∞
I
(
W1,W2; Y˜
n
γ
)
= 0, ∀γ (20)
where, as before, γ is used to index the eavesdropper channel state sequence. Again the conver-
gence of the limit in (20) must be uniform over all possible sequences of eavesdropper channel
states.
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Y˜
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W2
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W1
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Wˆ1
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R2
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Y1
Fig. 3. The (NT , NT , NT , NE) MIMO BC Wiretap Channel where legitimate nodes have NT = 2 antennas each, and the
eavesdropper has NE = 1 antenna.
The average power constraint for the transmitter is given by
lim
n→∞
1
n
trace(Xn(Xn)H) ≤ P¯ (21)
The secrecy rate Rs,k, k = 1, 2 is defined as in (16). The secure degrees of freedom region
(d1, d2) is defined as in (17).
III. MAIN RESULTS
The main results of this work are the following theorems:
Theorem 1: Let NT,R = min{NT , NR}. Let si be the NT,R singular values of H. Define P as
P = max{P¯ −NT,R, 0} (22)
Define C(x) as 1
2
log2(1 + x). Then any secrecy rate Rs that satisfies
0 ≤ Rs < max



NT,R∑
i=1
C
(
s2iP
(s2i + 1)NT,R
)−NEC (P ) , 0

 (23)
is achievable for the MIMO-wiretap channel described in Section II-A.
Theorem 1 is proved in Section IV.
In Section IV-G, we show that the achievable secrecy rate given by Theorem 1 matches the
converse in terms of secure degrees of freedom. Hence we have the following corollary.
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Corollary 1: If H has rank min{NT , NR}, then the s.d.o.f. of the MIMO-wiretap channel
described in Section II-A is
max{min{NT , NR} −NE , 0} (24)
The achievable secrecy rate given by Theorem 1 can be easily extended to the MIMO
(NT , NT , NT , NE) MAC wiretap channel and the MIMO (NT , NT , NT , NE) BC wiretap channel
using time sharing. Let α be the time sharing parameter, and α¯ = 1− α. Let [x]+ equal to x if
x ≥ 0 and 0 if x < 0. Define Pk,α, k = 1, 2 as:
Pk,α =
[
P¯k
α
−NT
]+
, k = 1, 2 (25)
Let “co” denote the convex hull operation, and sk,i, k = 1, 2 denote the NT singular values of
Hk. Then, for the MIMO (NT , NT , NT , NE) MAC wiretap channel, the achievable secrecy rate
region is given by:
co
⋃
α


(Rs,1, Rs,2) :
0 ≤ Rs,1 < α[
NT∑
i=1
C
(
s21,iP1,α
(s21,i+1)NT
)
−NEC (P1,α)]+
0 ≤ Rs,2 < α¯[
NT∑
i=1
C
(
s22,iP2,α¯
(s22,i+1)NT
)
−NEC (P2,α¯)]+


(26)
For the MIMO (NT , NT , NT , NE) BC wiretap channel, the achievable secrecy rate region is
given by:
co


(Rs,1, Rs,2) : (0, 0) ,
([
NT∑
i=1
C
(
s21,iP
(1+s21,i)NT
)
−NEC (P )]+, 0),
(0, [
NT∑
i=1
C
(
s22,iP
(1+s22,i)NT
)
−NEC (P )]+)


(27)
In Section V, we show that these achievable regions match their converse in terms of secure
degrees of freedom region. Hence we have the following two theorems:
Theorem 2: If Hk, k = 1, 2 has full rank, the secure degrees of freedom region of the MIMO
MAC wiretap channel in Figure 2 is given by:
d1 + d2 ≤ max{NT −NE, 0} (28)
di ≥ 0, i = 1, 2 (29)
HE AND YENER, SUBMITTED TO IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON INFORMATION THEORY 11
Theorem 3: If Hk, k = 1, 2 has full rank, the s.d.o.f. of the secrecy capacity region of the
MIMO BC wiretap channel in Figure 3 is given by:
d1 + d2 ≤ max{NT −NE, 0} (30)
di ≥ 0, i = 1, 2 (31)
Remark 1: When the eavesdropper’s channel state is fixed and known by the transmitters,
the s.d.o.f. region for the MIMO MAC wiretap channel is still an open problem. When the
eavesdropper’s channel state can take more than one possible value from a finite set and the set
is known by the transmitters, the s.d.o.f. region for the MIMO BC wiretap channel is also open.
On the other hand if the eavesdropper’s channel is arbitrarily varying and is only known by the
eavesdropper, and all legitimate nodes have the same number of antennas, the s.d.o.f. capacity
region of both problems are found in this paper.
IV. THE MIMO WIRETAP CHANNEL
In this section, we present our detailed results on the MIMO wiretap channel. The section is
divided into a number of subsections for the reader’s convenience. We first present the notation
used extensively in the sequel. The next several sections lead to the achievable rate provided by
Theorem 1. Section IV-B provides the channel transformation and signaling scheme. Section IV-C
presents the codebook construction. Section IV-D presents the achievability proof for the static
eavesdropper channel. Building on this proof, Section IV-E presents the achievable secrecy rate
for the arbitrarily varying eavesdropper channel. Both of these rates are proved with strong
secrecy. The achievable rate with weak secrecy is derived for completeness as well as maintaining
consistency with most of current literature in information theoretic secrecy, e.g., [7], [8]. A
diagram summarizing the steps leading to the achievability proof along with key methodologies
is provided in Figure 4. Finally, in Section IV-G, we present the converse to establish the secure
degrees of freedom result in Corollary 1.
A. Notation
We use pW (w) to denote the probability mass function (p.m.f.) of a random variable W
evaluated at w. fγ,A(a) denotes the probability density function (p.d.f.) of a random variable A
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Transformation
Codebook Construction 
Static Eavesdropper Channel
Arbitrarily Varying
Eavesdropper Channel
Channel state
qauntization and approximation
Artificial noise
Information spectrum method
Correlation elimination argument
Channel Model
Fig. 4. Organization of the proof for Theorem 1.
at value a with parameter γ. fγ,A|B(a|b) denotes the conditional p.d.f. of a random variable A
conditioned on a random variable B when A = a, B = b with parameter γ.
For a vector xn, we let ‖xn‖ denote its L2-norm. For a matrix A, we let ‖A‖2 denote the
sum of the L2-norm squared of all the row vectors of A. EB[A] denotes the expectation of A
averaged over B.
We define
A
n −BnCn (32)
as the row concatenation of the following matrices:
A(i)−B(i)C(i), 1 ≤ i ≤ n (33)
and
B
n
C
n (34)
as the row concatenation of the following matrices:
B(i)C(i), 1 ≤ i ≤ n (35)
B. Channel Model Transformation
Consider a general channel matrix H. We can perform singular value decomposition (SVD) on
H and canceling the right and left unitary matrices of its SVD decomposition at the transmitter
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and intended receiver respectively. After this cancellation, if NT > NR, the main channel is
equivalent to a MIMO channel whose channel state matrix is [DNR×NR, 0NR×(NT−NR)], where D
is a diagonal matrix composed of singular values of H. In this case, we simply use the first NR
antennas at the transmitter only in this equivalent channel when designing the achievable scheme.
The remaining NT −NR antennas transmit signals of value 0. If NT < NR, the main channel is
then equivalent to a MIMO link whose channel state matrix is [DNT×NT , 0NT×(NR−NT )]T , where
( )T means transpose operation. In this case, we simply discard the signals observed at the last
NR − NT antennas at the receiver in this equivalent channel when designing the achievable
scheme. In both cases, from the perspective of designing the achievable scheme, the resulting
main channel is equivalent to a MIMO link where the transmitter and the receiver both have
min{NT , NR} antennas and the channel matrix is diagonal. Thus, without loss of generality, we
assume NT = NR and H is a diagonal matrix.
We next observe that in order to prove Theorem 1, we only need to consider NE < min{NT , NR}.
When NE ≥ min{NT , NR}, the achievable secrecy rate in Theorem 1 is zero, by virtue of the
maximum of the two terms on the right hand side of (23) being zero.
Since NE < min{NT , NR}, H˜(i) has the following form of SVD decomposition:
H˜(i) = [INE×NE , 0NE×(NT−NE)]U(i) (36)
whereU(i) is a NT×NT unitary matrix. I is an identity matrix. This can be achieved by canceling
the left unitary matrix of the SVD decomposition of H˜(i) and normalizing the singular value at
the eavesdropper. Note that the transmitter does not know U(i).
Remark 2: Note that if H˜(i)(U(i))−1 has all zero rows, we can alter appropriate entries to be
1s so that the resulting channel matrix has the form in (36). The signals received by the original
eavesdropper is always degraded compared to the signals received by the eavesdropper after this
modification. Hence, it is sufficient to consider the eavesdroppers with H˜(i) in the form given
by (36).
Following [23], we introduce artificial noise at the transmitter. Thus, we have
X(i) = X˜(i) +N(i) (37)
where N is the NT × 1 artificial noise vector consisting of independent rotationally invariant
complex Gaussian random variables with zero mean and unit variance. Coding is over X˜.
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Define N¯ and N˜(i) as
N¯(i) = HN(i) (38)
N˜(i) = H˜(i)N(i) (39)
Viewing X˜ as the input to the channel, the channel model can be expressed as:
Y(i) = HX˜(i) + N¯(i) + Z(i) (40)
Y˜(i) = H˜(i)X˜(i) + N˜(i) (41)
From (36) and (39), we observe that N˜ has zero mean and is Gaussian distributed. The
covariance matrix of N˜ is
E[H˜(i)N(i)(N(i))H(H˜(i))H ] (42)
=H˜(i)E[N(i)(N(i))H ](H˜(i))H (43)
=H˜(i)(H˜(i))H (44)
=INE×NE (45)
C. Codebook Construction
The codebook ensemble we use is constructed as follows:
Recall that P was defined in (22). We choose the input distribution for X˜, Q
X˜
(x), as
rotationally invariant zero mean complex Gaussian with covariance matrix (P (1−εP )
NT
)INT×NT .
The codebook ensemble is composed of the codebooks constructed as described in [31, Section
7.3]. In the context of this work, this means defining the n-letter distribution Q
X˜n
(xn) as follows:
Let xi denote the ith component of xn. QX˜n(xn) is given by:
Q
X˜n
(xn) = µ−1n,εPϕ (x
n)
n∏
i=1
Q
X˜
(xi) (46)
where
ϕ (xn) =

 1, if
1
n
‖xn‖2 ≤ P
0, otherwise
(47)
µn,εP =
∫
ϕ (xn)
n∏
i=1
Q
X˜
(xi)dx
n (48)
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Note that 0 < µn,εP < 1, and for a given εP > 0, we have there exists an α(εP ) > 0, such that
[32, (B2)]
1− µn,εP ≤ e−nα(εP ) (49)
lim
εP→0
α(εP ) = 0 (50)
Any codebook in the ensemble is constructed by sampling 2nR sequences from the distribution
Q
X˜n
in an independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) fashion. For the strong secrecy proof,
R is chosen as
R = I(X˜;Y)− δ′ (51)
The mutual information in (51) is evaluated when X˜ has distribution Q
X˜
. δ′ is a positive constant
that can be arbitrarily small.
Each time we sample a codeword, we label it with (i, j). Define Ni and Nj as the range of i
and j. They are given by:
Ni = 2
n(R−I(X˜;Y˜)−δn) (52)
Nj = 2
n(I(X˜;Y˜)+δn) (53)
{δn} is a positive sequence whose details will be specified later. Again the mutual information
in (53) is evaluated when X˜ has distribution Q
X˜
. Note that we drop the subscript γ in this
expression since the value of the mutual information does not depend on γ when X˜ has the
distribution Q
X˜
.
The label i takes values from 1, ..., Ni. j takes values from 1, ..., Nj . The initial value for i
and j are both 1. After we label a codeword, if j < Nj , then we increase j by one. Otherwise,
we increase i by one and reset j to 1.
Let C denote a codebook in the codebook ensemble {C}. Let xni,j denote the codeword in the
codebook C that is labeled with (i, j).
As in [31], for a given codebook C, the intended receiver uses a maximum likelihood decoder:
Upon receiving Yn = yn, the decoder ψC(yn) is given by
ψC(yn) = arg max
i,j:xni,j∈C
‖yn −Hnxn‖ (54)
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The probability of decoding error for each codeword, and the average probability of decoding
error for each codebook and the codebook ensembles are defined as:
λC,i,j = Pr
(
ψC(Y˜n) 6= (i, j)|X˜n = xni,j
)
(55)
λC =
1
NiNj
∑
i,j
λC,i,j (56)
λ = EC [λC] (57)
We next present the strong secrecy rate when the eavesdropper’s channel is static.
D. Static Eavesdropper Channel
For a given codebook C, the encoder fn,C used by the transmitter is described as follows: Let
the confidential message W be uniformly distributed over the set of {i}. Given W = i, fn,C
selects a codeword from all the codewords with label i in codebook C according to a uniform
distribution. With this encoder, we observe that (i, j) has a uniform distribution.
Let X˜nG denote X˜n when it is sampled in an i.i.d. fashion from the input distribution QX˜(x)
instead of the codebook. Let X˜nT denote X˜n when it is sampled in an i.i.d. fashion from the
n-letter truncated Gaussian input distribution Q
X˜n
instead of the codebook.
Let Y˜nG, Y˜nT , Y˜nC denote Y˜n when X˜n is X˜nG, X˜nT or uniformly distributed over the codebook
C respectively.
Let γ index (a sequence of) the eavesdropper channel states over n channel uses: H˜γ(1), ..., H˜γ(n).
We use dγ,C to denote the variational distance between two distribution pWfγ,Y˜n
C
and pWfγ,Y˜n
C
|W ,
which is defined as:
dγ,C = d
(
pW fγ,Y˜n
C
, pW fγ,Y˜n
C
|W
)
(58)
=
∑
w
∫
|pW (w) fγ,Y˜n
C
(zn)− pW (w) fγ,Y˜n
C
|W (z
n|w) |dzn (59)
=
∑
w
pW (w)
∫
|fγ,Y˜n
C
(zn)− fγ,Y˜n
C
|W (z
n|w) |dzn (60)
The proof of achievability we present can be outlined in four steps:
1) As in [27], [33], we first prove for any eavesdropper channel state value indexed by γ, dγ,C
averaged over an ensemble of wiretap codebooks decreases uniformly and exponentially
fast with respect to the code length n using the information spectrum method from [34].
HE AND YENER, SUBMITTED TO IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON INFORMATION THEORY 17
2) We then quantize the channel states and construct a finite subset of values of the eaves-
dropper channel state. We show that for this subset, there must exist a good codebook that
retains the property of the codebook ensemble that dγ,C is small.
3) We show that when the eavesdropper channel state is not in the finite subset, the resulting
variational distance can be approximated by the variational distance when eavesdropper
channel state sequence is in the finite set and hence is also small. This is the approximation
argument from [35].
4) Building on 3), we prove that the secrecy constraint is satisfied [33], and hence the
codebook secures the message for all possible values of eavesdropper channel states.
We start the proof with the following lemma:
Lemma 1: [27, Appendix II, Section D] For a fixed codebook in the ensemble, we have:
dγ,C ≤ 2
∑
w
pW (w)
∫
|fγ,Y˜nT (z
n)− fγ,Y˜n
C
|W (z
n|w) |dzn (61)
For each integral in the sum in (61), we can write∫
|fγ,Y˜nT (z
n)− fγ,Y˜n
C
|W (z
n|w) |dzn (62)
≤
∫
|fγ,Y˜n
G
(zn)− fγ,Y˜n
C
|W (z
n|w) |dzn +
∫
|fγ,Y˜n
G
(zn)− fγ,Y˜n
T
(zn) |dzn (63)
For the second term in (63), we have the following lemma:
Lemma 2: For sufficiently large n, such that 1/2 > e−nα(εP ), we have:∫
|fγ,Y˜nG (z
n)− fγ,Y˜nT (z
n) |dzn < 4e−nα(εP ) (64)
where α(εP ) is the positive exponent defined in (49).
Proof: The proof is given in Appendix A.
We then can bound the second term in (63) using Lemma 2. We next bound the first term in
(63), averaged over W .
As in [27, Appendix II, Section D], we can use the symmetry property of the random codebook
ensemble and write:
EC
[∑
w
pW (w)
∫
|fγ,Y˜nG (z
n)− fγ,Y˜n
C
|W (z
n|w) |dzn
]
(65)
=EC
[∫
|fγ,Y˜n
G
(zn)− fγ,Y˜n
C
|W (z
n|1) |dzn
]
. (66)
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See Appendix B for steps to arrive at (66) from (65).
For (66), we have the following lemma:
Lemma 3: [34, Lemma 5] For a fixed codebook in the ensemble, we have:
∫
|fγ,Y˜nG (z
n)− fγ,Y˜n
C
|W (z
n|1) |dzn ≤ 2
log2 e
µn + 2Pr

log2 fγ,Y˜nC |W
(
Y˜
n
C |1
)
fγ,Y˜nG
(
Y˜nC
) > µn

 (67)
Let fγ,Y˜|X˜ denote the conditional p.d.f. implied by the channel matrix H˜γ . Define information
density [34], iγ,X˜n
G
Y˜n
G
(
X˜
n, Y˜n
)
, as :
iγ,X˜nGY˜nG
(
X˜
n, Y˜n
)
= log2
n∏
i=1
fγ,Y˜|X˜
(
Y˜i|X˜i
)
fγ,Y˜n
G
(
Y˜n
) (68)
Remark 3: Note that the subscript of iγ,X˜nGY˜nG
(
X˜
n, Y˜n
)
simply indicates the p.d.f.s we use
to compute the information spectrum, which are fγ,Y˜|X˜ and fγ,Y˜nG in this case. The arguments
of iγ,X˜n
G
Y˜n
G
(
X˜
n, Y˜n
)
, X˜
n and Y˜n, can have a different p.d.f. than the one indicated by the
subscript of iγ,X˜nGY˜nG
(
X˜
n, Y˜n
)
.
Lemma 4: For any positive µn, such that,
τn =
(
2µn − µ−1n,εP
)
/2 > 0 (69)
we have:
EC

Pr

log2 fγ,Y˜nC |W
(
Y˜
n
C |1
)
fγ,Y˜nG
(
Y˜nC
) > µn



 ≤ (70)
µ−1n,εP{Pr
[
1
n
iγ,X˜nGY˜nG
(
X˜
n
G, Y˜
n
G
)
> I
(
X˜G; Y˜G
)
+ δn +
1
n
log2 τn
]
+
Pr
[
1
n
iγ,X˜nGY˜nG
(
X˜
n
G, Y˜
n
G
)
> I
(
X˜G; Y˜G
)
+ δn
]
+
1
τ 2n
(
Pr
[
1
n
iγ,X˜nGY˜nG
(
X˜
n
G, Y˜
n
G
)
> I
(
X˜G; Y˜G
)
+
δn
2
]
+ 2−nδn/2
)
} (71)
Remark 4: The proof of Lemma 4 is adapted from [34, Proof of Theorem 4]. The difference is
that, [34, Proof of Theorem 4] would require the expectation to be taken over an ensemble whose
codewords are sampled in an i.i.d. fashion from a Gaussian distribution, since (71) is evaluated
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for this distribution. In Lemma 4, the expectation is over the ensemble whose codewords are
sampled from Q
X˜n
, which is close to but not equal to a Gaussian distribution. This difference
leads to the term µ−1n,εP in front of the upper bound given by (71).
Proof: The proof is provided in Appendix C.
Lemma 5: For a given ε > 0, if for all n, δn ≥ ε, then there exists a constant α′(ε) > 0, such
that
Pr
[
1
n
iγ,X˜nGY˜nG
(
X˜
n
G, Y˜
n
G
)
> I
(
X˜G; Y˜G
)
+ δn
]
≤ e−nα′(ε) (72)
Proof: The proof is provided in Appendix D.
Remark 5: Lemma 5 is termed exponentially information stable [33, Section 2].
We next apply Lemma 5 to Lemma 4 and Lemma 3, to bound the first term of (63). Then by
using Lemma 2, which bounds the second term on the right hand side of (63), we have the
following lemma:
Lemma 6: For a given ε > 0, if δn is chosen as:
δn ≥ max{2ε, ε+ α(εP )
2
log2 e} (73)
then there exists a constant c′ such that for sufficiently large n, we have:
EC
[
2
∑
w
pW (w)
∫
zn
|fγ,Y˜nG (z
n)− fγ,Y˜n
C
|W (z
n|w) |dzn
]
≤ exp(−c′n) (74)
and
EC [dγ,C] ≤ EC
[
2
∑
w
pW (w)
∫
zn
|fγ,Y˜n
T
(zn)− fγ,Y˜n
C
|W (z
n|w) |dzn
]
≤ exp(−c′n) (75)
The value of c′ depends only on ε and εP . The minimum n for (74) and (75) to hold depends
only on εP .
Proof: The proof is provided in Appendix E.
Note that (75) is the result mentioned in the first step in the proof outline.
We next construct the finite set SM of quantized eavesdropper channel state values as men-
tioned in the second step of the proof outline. SM is defined as follows: If the real and imaginary
parts of each element in MH˜γ are integers, γ is in SM . Note that from (36), H˜H˜H = INE×NE ,
hence the absolute value of the real and imaginary parts of each element in H˜ can not exceed
1. Therefore SM is a finite set with at most (2M + 1)2NTNE components.
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Then from (75), we have:∑
γ∈SM
EC [dγ,C] ≤ (2M + 1)2NTNE exp(−c′n) (76)
Remark 6: Note that this is the same strategy used in proving the compound channel coding
theorem in [35]. Reference [35] considered a discrete memoryless channel which is taken from
a potentially infinite set and SM is constructed by quantizing the channel transition probability
matrix. Here, since we are considering the Gaussian channel, doing so will not lead to a finite
set. Hence we construct SM by quantizing the channel gains instead.
Since the codebook ensemble is constructed as in [31], for some n0, we have, that [31]
λ ≤ 5 exp(−nE(R(δ′))), ∀n > n0 (77)
where λ, defined in (57), is the average probability of the decoding error for the codebook
ensemble .
Hence, as in [27, Appendix II, Section E], from Markov inequality and (77), we know there
must exist one codebook such that
1) The probability of decoding error of the intended receiver vanishes as n→∞.
2) For each γ ∈ SM , we have
dγ,C ≤2
∑
w
pW (w)
∫
zn
|fγ,Y˜nG (z
n)− fγ,Y˜n
C
|W (z
n|w) |dzn (78)
≤3× 2(2M + 1)2NTNEe−c′n (79)
Also, we observe, by our definition of the codebook ensemble that, for this fixed codebook, the
average power of each codeword must be smaller or equal to P .
This concludes the second step in the proof outline. From here onward, all the discussion is
considering on this fixed codebook.
We next evaluate dγ,C when the eavesdropper’s channel matrix H˜γ is indexed by γ, γ /∈ SM .
Let Ai denote the ith row of matrix A. We know there must exist a γ′ ∈ SM , such that for
the ith row of ∆h(k) = H˜γ(k)− H˜γ′(k), denoted by ∆h,i(k), we have:
‖∆h,i(k)‖2 < 2NT/M2, i = 1, ..., NE, k = 1, ..., n (80)
With the notation (34), we define ∆nx = ∆nhxn, xn ∈ C. Note that xn is an NT × n matrix and
trace[xn(xn)H ] < nP, ∀xn ∈ C.
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Let λmax(A) be the largest eigenvalue of matrix A. Then for the ith row of ∆nx, ∆nx,i, we
have:
1
n
∥∥∆nx,i∥∥2 (81)
=
1
n
∥∥∆nh,ixn∥∥2 (82)
=
1
n
n∑
k=1
‖∆h,i(k)x(k)‖2 (83)
≤ 1
n
n∑
k=1
λmax
(
x(k) (x(k))H
)
‖∆h,i (k)‖2 (84)
≤ 1
n
n∑
k=1
λmax
(
x(k) (x(k))H
) 2NT
M2
(85)
≤ 1
n
n∑
k=1
trace
(
x(k) (x(k))H
) 2NT
M2
(86)
≤trace
(
1
n
n∑
k=1
x(k) (x(k))H
)
2NT
M2
(87)
≤2NTP
M2
(88)
In (85), we use (80). In (86), we use the fact that the eigenvalues of 1
n
x(k) (x(k))H are nonneg-
ative.
It follows then that
1
n
‖∆nx‖2 ≤
2NTNEP
M2
. (89)
For ε > 0, define r′ and r as:
(r′)2 =
2NTNEP
M2
(90)
r = r′ +
√
NE(1 + ε) (91)
With X˜n and Y˜n being the inputs and outputs of the eavesdropper channel with states H˜nγ ,
Y˜
n − H˜nγX˜n is a zero mean rotationally invariant Gaussian distribution whose covariance matrix
is an identity matrix. Since from (91), it follows that r2 > NE(1+ε) > NE , there exists a positive
α(ε), such that [32, (B2)]:
Pr
(
1
n
∥∥∥Y˜n − H˜nγX˜n∥∥∥2 ≥ r2|X˜n = xn
)
< e−nα(ε) (92)
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Note that this bound is uniform regardless of the value of the channel matrix H˜nγ .
Lemma 7: Define g(r, r′) as
g(r, r′) = r′(2r + r′) (93)
if we can choose M with respect to n such that
ng(r, r′) < 1 (94)
then there must exist γ′ ∈ SM such that
dγ,C ≤2
∑
w
pW (w)
∫
|fγ,Y˜nG (z
n)− fγ,Y˜n
C
|W (z
n|w) |dzn + 8e−nα(εP ) (95)
≤2
∑
w
pW (w)
∫
|fγ′,Y˜nG (z
n)− fγ′,Y˜n
C
|W (z
n|w) |dzn + 12e−nα(ε) + 4ng(r, r′) (96)
≤12(2M + 1)2NTNEe−c′n + 12e−nα(ε) + 4ng(r, r′) (97)
Proof: The proof is provided in Appendix F.
Remark 7: The proof of Lemma 7 requires the property that the average energy of each
codeword in the codebook does not exceed P . This is the reason we need to sample from
distribution (46) when we construct the codebook ensemble.
Lemma 8: There exists a codebook, such that for c0 > 0, we have
dγ,C < exp(−c0n), ∀γ (98)
Proof: g(r, r′) decrease at the rate of 1/M . Hence there must exist a positive constant
cM > 0, such that M = exp(ncM) and both 2(2M + 1)2NTNE exp(−c′n) and ng(r, r′) decrease
exponentially fast to 0 with respect to n. Applying it to Lemma 7, we have Lemma 8.
Let c4 = δ′ +max{2ε, ε+ α(εP )2 log2 e}. From (51), (52) and (73), we observe the codebook
rate is given by
lim
n→∞
1
n
H (W ) ≥ I
(
X˜;Y
)
−NEC (P (1− εP ))− c4 (99)
where C(x) = log2(1 + x). From (50), we notice that (99) can be made arbitrarily close to
I
(
X˜;Y
)
−NEC (P )) (100)
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To prove that (100) is an achievable secrecy rate, we need the following lemma from [33],
which relates dγ,C to the mutual information I
(
W ; Y˜nγ
)
:
Lemma 9: [33, Lemma 1] Let |W| be the cardinality of the message set W . Then we have:
I
(
W ; Y˜nγ
)
≤ dγ,C log2
|W|
dγ,C
(101)
As shown by Lemma 8, the variational distance dγ,C decreases to 0 exponentially fast with respect
to n. Since W is uniformly distributed over W , log2 |W| is H(W ). As shown by (99), H(W )
increases linearly with n. Hence from Lemma 9, I
(
W ; Y˜nγ
)
decreases to 0 exponentially fast
with respect to n.
This, along with the fact that W is received reliably by the intended receiver and the average
power constraint is satisfied by each codeword in the codebook, shows that the rate of the
codebook given by (100) is indeed an achievable secrecy rate.
The achieved secrecy rate can then be found by evaluating (100) based on (38) and (40),
which leads to (23). This concludes the proof for the static case.
We next extend the result we derived for the static channel to the case where the eavesdropper
channel is arbitrarily varying.
E. Arbitrarily Varying Eavesdropper Channel
When the eavesdropper channel is arbitrarily varying, the second step in the proof for the
static case must be modified. This is because, even though the variational distance decreases
exponentially fast, the size of the subset SM of the eavesdropper channel state sequences also
increases exponentially fast. In this case, Markov inequality is not sufficient to guarantee the
existence of a good codebook and the correlation elimination argument from [36] must be used.
The proof outline is as follows:
1) The first step is the same as the static case. We prove for any given sequence of the
eavesdropper channel states, the variational distance averaged over an ensemble of wiretap
codebooks decreases uniformly and exponentially fast with respect to the code length n.
2) Then, for the finite a subset of quantized eavesdropper channel state sequences, we use
the correlation elimination argument from [36] to show that there exists a small number
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of codebooks in the codebook ensemble3 such that the variational distance averaged over
these codebooks is small when the eavesdropper channel state sequence is within the finite
set. This is proved by showing that the probability that the variational distance averaged
over these codebooks exceeds any given constant is super-exponentially small with respect
to n for an eavesdropper channel state sequence within the finite subset.
3) The third step is the same as the static case. We show that when the eavesdropper channel
state sequence is outside the finite set, the variational distance averaged over this small
set of codebooks can be approximated by the variational distance when the eavesdropper
channel state sequence is in the finite set and hence is also small. As in the static case
proof, a small variational distance implies that the secrecy constraint is satisfied.
4) We then use the small set of codebooks to construct the coding scheme using a two stage
transmission scheme introduced in [36].
We next start the proof by defining a normalized version of the variational distance. For a
given codebook C, and a given eavesdropper channel state sequence
{H˜γ(1), ..., H˜γ(n)}
define the normalized variational distance d′γ,C as:
d′γ,C =
1
2
∑
w
pW (w)
∫
zn
|fγ,Y˜nG (z
n)− fγ,Y˜n
C
|W (z
n|w) |dzn (102)
Clearly, we have
0 ≤ d′γ,C ≤ 1 (103)
Also, from (95) in Lemma 7, we have:
dγ,C ≤ 4d′γ,C + 8e−nα(εP ) (104)
We then use Lemma 6 to bound d′γ,C . Note that Lemma 6 still holds when the eavesdropper
channel is arbitrarily varying.
From (74) in Lemma 6, there must exist a constant c′, which only depends on ε and εP such
that
EC
[
d′γ,C
] ≤ exp(−c′n) (105)
3In our case, K = eε
′n codebooks, where ε′ is a positive constant that can be made arbitrarily small.
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Applying (105) to (104), we complete the first step in the proof outline.
We next use the correlation elimination argument from [36] and consider K codebooks, each
generated as described in Section IV-C. Denote the kth codebook with Ck. Ck is a random variable,
and so is 1
K
∑K
k=1 d
′
γ,Ck . Since for different k, Ck are i.i.d., d′γ,Ck are also i.i.d.. These facts, along
with (103), mean that the derivation in [36, (4.1)-(4.5)] can be applied here. In particular, the
j, Tj , ε and R in [36] corresponds to k, d′γ,Ck , c′ and K here respectively. Consider a positive
sequence {ǫn}. Reference [36, (4.1)-(4.5)] shows that if (105) holds, then for α′ > 0 and for n
such that:
1 + eα
′
e−c
′n ≤ eǫn (106)
we have:
Pr
(
1
K
K∑
k=1
d′γ,Ck ≥ ǫn
)
≤ e−(α′−1)Kǫn. (107)
Let α′ = 2. Then we have
Pr
(
1
K
K∑
k=1
d′γ,Ck ≥ ǫn
)
≤ e−ǫnK . (108)
Define the following finite set SM of γ: If the real and imaginary parts of each element in MH˜γ(i)
are integers for all i = 1, ..., n, then γ ∈ SM . Note that from (36), H˜(i)(H˜(i))H = INE×NE ,
hence the absolute value of the real and imaginary parts of each element in H˜(i) can not exceed
1. Therefore SM is a finite set with at most (2M + 1)2NTNEn components.
Let |SM | denote the size of the set SM . Then we have:
Pr
(
1
K
K∑
k=1
d′γ,Ck < ǫn, ∀γ ∈ SM
)
(109)
≥1− |SM |Pr
(
1
K
K∑
k=1
d′γ,Ck > ǫn
)
(110)
=1− |SM |e−ǫnK (111)
When γ /∈ SM , from (96) in Lemma 7, we have that if
ng(r, r′) < 1 (112)
then there must exist γ′ ∈ SM , such that
d′γ,C ≤ d′γ′,C + e−nα(ε) + ng(r, r′). (113)
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Recall that r and r′ were defined in (91) and (90) respectively. It follows that we have:
1
K
K∑
k=1
d′γ,Ck ≤
1
K
K∑
k=1
d′γ′,Ck + e
−nα(ε) + ng(r, r′). (114)
From Markov inequality and (77), we have:
Pr
(
λCk > 5nKe
−Np(R(δ′))
)
≤ 1
nK
(115)
Therefore:
Pr
(
∃k : λCk > 5nKe−nE(R(δ
′))
)
(116)
≤
K∑
k=1
Pr
(
λCk > 5nKe
−nE(R(δ′))
)
(117)
≤1
n
(118)
Or equivalently
Pr
(
λCk ≤ 5nKe−nE(R(δ
′)), k = 1, ..., K
)
≥ 1− 1
n
. (119)
We next choose ǫn, the number of codebooks K and the variable M , which controls the size of
the set |SM | carefully such that for sufficiently large n,
1) (106) is satisfied.
2) 1
K
K∑
k=1
d′γ,Ck in (109) vanishes with high probability for γ ∈ SM .
3) 1
K
K∑
k=1
d′γ,Ck on the left hand side of (114) vanishes for γ /∈ SM . Note that in order to use
the bound (114) to prove this result, (112) must be satisfied and the right hand side of
(114) must vanish as well, which relies on 2).
4) λCk , k = 1, ..., K in (119) vanishes with high probability.
Satisfying these conditions leads to the claim that there exists K good codebooks.
A proper choice for ǫn, K and M is as follows: Recall that α(ε) was defined in (92). α(εP )
was defined in (49) and (50). For a positive constant ε′ such that
ε′ < c′ (120)
ε′ < α(ε) (121)
ε′ < α(εP ) (122)
HE AND YENER, SUBMITTED TO IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON INFORMATION THEORY 27
2ε′ < E(R(δ′)) (123)
ǫn, K and M are chosen to be:
ǫn = e
−nε′ (124)
K = e2ε
′n (125)
M = e2ε
′n (126)
c′ in (120) was given in (105).
We first check if these choices satisfy (106). We observe that, since ǫn > 0, the right hand
side of (106) is lower bounded as:
eǫn ≥ 1 + ǫn (127)
which, due to (124), equals:
1 + e−ε
′n (128)
Due to (120), we find (128) is greater than the left hand side of (106) for sufficiently large n
such that
1 + e2e−c
′n < 1 + e−ε
′n (129)
Hence, (106) is satisfied.
Next we observe from (124) and (125) that
e−ǫnK = e−e
−nε′e2nε
′
= e−e
nε′ (130)
We also observe that, due to (126), for sufficiently large n,
2M + 1 ≤ e4ε′n (131)
Hence,
|SM | = (2M + 1)2NTNEn < e8NTNEε′n2 (132)
Therefore, from (130) and (132), we have:
lim
n→∞
|SM |e−ǫnK = 0 (133)
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This means (111) will converge to 1 when n goes to ∞. Since ǫn is shown by (124) to converge
to 0 when n goes to ∞, we observe, from (109)-(111), that 1
K
K∑
k=1
d′γ,Ck in (109) vanishes with
high probability.
We next examine (114). We observe from (90), (91) and (93) that g(r, r′) decreases at the
rate of 1/M which, according to (126), equals e−2ε′n. Hence for sufficiently large n, we have
ng(r, r′) < e−1.5ε
′n < e−ε
′n = ǫn (134)
holds and (112) is satisfied.
Also, due to (121), we have
e−nα(ε) < e−nε
′
= ǫn (135)
If, for the γ′ in (114),
1
K
K∑
k=1
d′γ′,Ck < ǫn (136)
then, from (134), (135) and (114), we have
1
K
K∑
k=1
d′γ,Ck < 3ǫn (137)
Hence, from (109)-(111), (133) and (136)-(137), we observe there must exist K codebooks,
where K is given by (125), such that for any k and γ,
λCk ≤ 5nKe−nE(R(δ
′)) (138)
1
K
K∑
k=1
d′γ,Ck < 3ǫn (139)
ǫn is given by (124).
We next check if our choice of K leads to a vanishing λCk . By applying (125) to the right
hand side of (138), we find it equals:
5ne−n(E(R(δ
′))−2ε′) (140)
Due to (123), we find that the right hand side of (138) converges to 0 when n goes to ∞. This
means:
lim
n→∞
λCk = 0, ∀k (141)
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We next express (139) in terms of dγ,Ck . Due to (122), we have, from (104), for sufficiently
large n:
12ǫn = 12e
−nε′ > 8e−nα(εP ) (142)
Hence (139) implies
1
K
K∑
k=1
dγ,Ck < 24ǫn, ∀γ (143)
(143) concludes the second and third steps in the proof outline.
We next use the K codebooks to construct the coding scheme. Let the confidential message
W be uniformly distributed over the set of {1, ..., Ni}. The encoder fn used by the transmitter
is described as follows:
1) In the first stage, the transmitter chooses the value for an integer K ′ from {1, ..., K}
according to a uniform distribution. Given W = i, fn outputs the label (i, j) computed by
fn,CK′ .
2) In the second stage, K ′ is transmitted to the intended receiver using a good channel
codebook for the main channel.
The decoder of the intended receiver first decode K ′, then decode the confidential message using
ψn,CK′ .
Let Kˆ ′ be the result decoded by the intended receiver for K ′. Then
Pr
(
W 6= Wˆ
)
(144)
≤Pr
(
K ′ 6= Kˆ ′
)
+ Pr
(
W 6= Wˆ |K ′ = Kˆ ′
)
(145)
=Pr
(
K ′ 6= Kˆ ′
)
+
1
K
K∑
k=1
λCk (146)
Since
lim
n→∞
Pr
(
K ′ 6= Kˆ ′
)
= 0 (147)
and (141) holds, we have limn→∞ Pr
(
W 6= Wˆ
)
= 0.
The variational distance for this coding scheme, dγ , is given by
dγ = d
(
pWpK ′fγ,Y˜ n
C
K′
, pWpK ′fγ,Y˜ n
C
K′
|W
)
(148)
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=
∑
k,w
pW (w) pK ′ (k)
∫
|fγ,Y˜ n
Ck
(zn)− fγ,Y˜ n
Ck
|W (z
n|w) |dzn (149)
=
1
K
K∑
k=1
dγ,Ck (150)
From (143) and (124), we observe that (150) decreases at the speed of e−ε′n. Then from Lemma 9,
we have:
lim
n→∞
I
(
W ;K ′, Y˜nγ
)
= 0, ∀γ (151)
The convergence is uniform over all possible eavesdropper channel matrix sequences and the
limit decreases exponentially fast with respect to n. Let n′ denote the total number of channel
uses. Then the second stage takes n2 channel uses with n2 given by:
n2 =
1
R
log2K =
2ε′ log2 e
R0
n (152)
where R0 > 0 is the rate of the conventional channel codebook C0. The first stage takes n
channel uses. Therefore
n′ = n+ n2 =
(
2ε′ log2 e
R0
+ 1
)
n (153)
Define c(ε′) as
c(ε′) =
2ε′ log2 e
R0
+ 1 (154)
which can be made arbitrarily close to 1 by making ε′ small.
Let Y˜n2γ denote the signals received by the eavesdropper during the second stage. Then
lim
n′→∞
I
(
W ; Y˜n
′
γ
)
(155)
= lim
n′→∞
I
(
W ; Y˜nγ , Y˜
n2
γ
)
(156)
≤ lim
n′→∞
I
(
W ;K ′, Y˜nγ
)
(157)
= lim
n→∞
I
(
W ;K ′, Y˜nγ
)
(158)
=0, ∀γ (159)
Let c4 = δ′ +max{2ε, ε+ α(εP )2 log2 e}. The secrecy rate is then given by:
lim
n′→∞
1
n′
H (W ) ≥ (I
(
X˜;Y
)
−NEC (P (1− εP ))− c4)c(ε′) (160)
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From (50), we notice (160) can be made arbitrarily close to
I
(
X˜;Y
)
−NEC (P ) (161)
Therefore, the same secrecy rate as given in (23) is achievable even when the eavesdropper
channel is arbitrarily varying.
Remark 8: In order to use the correlation elimination argument from [36], we made three
modifications to its proof:
1) Instead of using average error probability as in [36], we use the normalized variational
distance defined in (102).
2) In [36], only K = n2 codebooks are used. Here, in order to use Lemma 9 to bound the
mutual information with the variational distance, we use K = eε′n codebooks.
3) In [36], the index of the codebook used at the transmitter, i.e., K ′, needs to be reliably
communicated to the receiver over an arbitrarily varying channel. In this work, K ′ is
transmitted using a good channel codebook for the main channel which is static. On
the other hand, K ′ may or may not be reliably received over the arbitrarily varying
eavesdropper channel. We simply assume K ′ is revealed to the eavesdropper in order
to compute the lower bound on the achievable secrecy rate which is our goal.
F. Achievable Rate with Weak Secrecy with a Static Eavesdropper Channel
The weak secrecy constraint is expressed as
lim
n→∞
1
n
I(W ; Y˜nγ ) = 0, ∀γ. (162)
The proof of the weak secrecy rate differs from that for the strong secrecy rate in Section IV-D.
In particular, instead of using the information spectrum method from [34], we use an argument
that is similar to [17]. This means that we prove the existence of a codebooks composed of a
number of sub-codebooks with the following property: Each sub-codebook is a good channel
code for the eavesdropper channel4. The entire codebook is a good channel code for the main
channel. These properties allow us to bound the equivocation as in [17].
4That is to say that if the eavesdropper knows the transmitted signals are restricted to a certain sub-codebook, it can decode
the transmitted confidential message reliably.
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We start the proof by describing the codebook ensemble. Any codebook in the ensemble
is constructed by sampling 2nR sequences in an i.i.d. fashion from the distribution Q
X˜n
with
εP = 0, where QX˜n was given by (46).
For weak secrecy, R is chosen as
R = I(X˜;Y)− 2δn (163)
{δn}, which will be specified later, is a positive sequence that converges to 0 when n goes to
∞.
Each time we sample a codeword, we label it with (i, j), i ∈ {1, ..., Ni}, j ∈ {1, ..., Nj},
where Ni and Nj are given by
Ni = 2
n(R−I(X˜;Y˜)+δn) (164)
Nj = 2
n(I(X˜;Y˜)−δn) (165)
Note the difference of the choice of Nj in (165) from that used in the strong secrecy proof, i.e.,
(53).
Labeling is done as it was in the strong secrecy proof: Initially i = j = 1. After we label
a codeword, if j < Nj , then j is incremented by 1. Otherwise, i is incremented by 1 and j is
reset to 1.
The intended receiver uses the same decoding rule as in (54).
We also define a fictitious decoder φγ used by the eavesdropper whose channel state matrix is
H˜γ . The decoder computes j given i = i0 and Y˜n = y˜n, and is a maximum likelihood decoder:
φγ(y˜
n) = arg max
j:xni0,j
∈C
‖y˜n − H˜xni0,j‖ (166)
With the decoders defined, we can then, as in [17, Appendix A], define the following proba-
bilities of error when the codeword Xni,j is transmitted:
We use ηγ,j|i to denote the error probability for the eavesdropper to reliably decode j given i
and Y˜n when the channel state matrix is H˜γ .
Let the distribution of i, j as pi,j . Then we can define the average probability of decoding
error, ηγ , as
ηγ =
∑
i,j
pi,j(i, j)ηγ,j|i (167)
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In (167), pi,j is determined by the encoder fn used by the transmitter, which we shall specify
next. Let the confidential message W be uniformly distributed over the set of {i}. Given W = i,
fn selects a codeword from all the codewords with label i according to a uniform distribution.
With this encoder, we note that pi,j is uniform, and therefore
H(X˜n) = nR (168)
For the intended receiver, we simply follow the definitions of the probabilities of decoding
error in (55)-(57).
We then use the following facts:
Lemma 10: For the codebook ensemble described above, EC [ηγ ] is the same for all γ.
Proof: The proof is provided in Appendix G.
Then, as in the proof of the strong secrecy rate, we quantize the channel gains of the
eavesdropper channel and construct the same finite set SM we used in the strong secrecy proof.
From [31, (7.3.22)], we know that there exists an error exponent E(R) > 0 such that, for
some n0,
λ = EC[λC] ≤ 5 exp(−nE(R)), ∀n > n0. (169)
By the same argument, for an eavesdropper whose channel matrix is H˜γ indexed by γ ∈ SM ,
we know there exists an error exponent E ′γ(R˜) > 0 such that for some n0,
EC[ηγ ] ≤ 5 exp(−nE ′γ(R˜)), ∀n > n0 (170)
where R˜ = I(X˜, Y˜)− δn.
Remark 9: The constant factor of 5 in (169)-(170) and the requirement n > n0 is used to
bound the term (1/µ)1+ρ in [31, (7.3.22)], since ρ ≤ 1 and limn→∞ µ = 1/2. Hence n0 is not a
function of γ.
Note that by Lemma 10, EC[ηγ ] is not a function of γ. Hence, if an error exponent holds for
a certain γ, it holds for all γ. Therefore, we can omit the subscript γ in the error exponent and
rewrite it as E ′(R˜).
Recall that 2δn = I(X˜,Y)− R. Hence, we can rewrite both E(R) and E ′(R˜) as a function
of δn. From [31], E(R) and E ′(R) have the following property: For R > 0 and R˜ > 0:
1) E(R) and E ′(R˜) are both positive.
2) Both E(R) and E ′(R˜) are monotonically decreasing functions of δn.
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3) If δn → 0, then both E(R) and E ′(R˜) converge to 0.
Let E¯(δn) = max{E(R), E ′(R˜)}. Then E¯(δn) also has the three properties listed above. From
the linearity of expectation, for sufficiently large n that does not depend on γ, we can write:
EC
[
λC +
∑
γ∈SM
ηγ
]
≤ 5((2M + 1)2NTNE + 1)e−E¯(δn)n (171)
This means there must exist one codebook in the ensemble such that
λC ≤ 5((2M + 1)2NTNE + 1)e−E¯(δn)n (172)
ηγ ≤ 5((2M + 1)2NTNE + 1)e−E¯(δn)n (173)
We next consider the equivocation for one eavesdropper whose channel matrix is in the set
SM , with this codebook:
H
(
W |Y˜nγ
)
(174)
=H
(
W |Y˜nγ
)
−H
(
W |Y˜nγ , X˜n
)
(175)
=I
(
W ; X˜n|Y˜nγ
)
(176)
=H
(
X˜
n|Y˜nγ
)
−H
(
X˜
n|W, Y˜nγ
)
(177)
Applying Fano’s inequality [37] to the second term in (177), we find it is upper bounded by:
H
(
X˜
n|Y˜nγ
)
− 1− ηγnR (178)
Applying (173) to (178), we find it is upper bounded by:
H
(
X˜
n|Y˜nγ
)
− 1− 5nR
(
(2M + 1)2NTNE + 1
)
e−E¯(δn)n (179)
Define εn as:
εn =
1
n
+ 5R
(
(2M + 1)2NTNE + 1
)
e−E¯(δn)n (180)
Then, we can rewrite (179) as:
H
(
X˜
n
)
− I
(
X˜
n; Y˜nγ
)
− nεn (181)
≥H
(
X˜
n
)
− h
(
Y˜
n
γ
)
+ h
(
Y˜
n
γ |X˜n
)
− nεn (182)
=nR− h
(
Y˜
n
γ
)
+ h
(
Y˜
n
γ |X˜n
)
− nεn (183)
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where (183) follows by applying (168).
To proceed, we need the following lemma:
Lemma 11:
h
(
Y˜
n
γ
)
≤ NEn log πe(P + 1), ∀γ (184)
Proof: The proof is given in Appendix H.
Using Lemma 11 and (168) and the fact that h
(
Y˜
n
γ |X˜n
)
= nNE log πe, we find (183) is
upper bounded by:
nR− nNE log2 (1 + P )− nεn (185)
=n
(
I
(
X˜;Y
)
−NEC (P )
)
− n(2δn + εn). (186)
Hence
H
(
W |Y˜nγ
)
≥ n
(
I
(
X˜;Y
)
−NEC (P )
)
− n(2δn + εn). (187)
On the other hand, H(W ) is given by:
H (W ) = n
(
I
(
X˜;Y
)
− I
(
X˜; Y˜γ
))
− nδn (188)
=n
(
I
(
X˜;Y
)
−NEC (P )
)
− nδn. (189)
Therefore we have
I
(
W ; Y˜nγ
)
≤ n (δn + εn) . (190)
We next derive an upper bound on I
(
W ; Y˜nγ
)
when the eavesdropper’s channel matrix is not
in SM .
Let r2 = 2NE and (r′)2 = 2NTNEPM2 . Define α as in (92) with r2 = 2NE . Let gr,r′ = r′(2r+r′).
Let H˜γ denote the channel matrix of the eavesdropper. From our construction of SM , we
know there must exist an H˜γ′ indexed by γ′ ∈ SM such that (80) holds.
We let the eavesdropper with channel matrix H˜γ use the same “fictitious” decoder we designed
for the eavesdropper with channel matrix H˜′γ . ηγ be the corresponding probability of decoding
error with this decoder. Then we have the following lemma:
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Lemma 12:
ηγ ≤ e−nα + 5((2M + 1)2NTNE + 1)e−(E¯(δn)−g(r,r′)n (191)
Proof: The proof is provided in Appendix I.
We next repeat the equivocation computation in (174)-(190). This yields:
I
(
W ; Y˜nγ
)
≤ n (δn + ε′n) (192)
where
ε′n =
1
n
+R
(
e−nα + 5((2M + 1)2NTNE + 1)
)
e−(E¯(δn)−g(r,r
′))n (193)
The last step of the achievability proof requires choosing δn carefully with respect to n, such
that εn and ε′n goes to 0 as n goes to ∞. This can be done by choosing E¯(δn) properly as
follows:
1) E¯(δn) decreases to 0 at the rate of n−1/2, which ensures nE¯(δn) → ∞ as n → ∞.
2) M increases at the rate of n, hence g(r, r′) decreases at the rate of n−1. Therefore n(E¯(δn)−
g(r, r′)) → ∞ at the rate of exp(−c1
√
n) for c1 > 0, as n→∞.
Since E¯(δn) is a monotonically decreasing function of δn, this means δn converges to 0 as
n → ∞. We also observe in this case both εn and ε′n converge uniformly to 0 as n → ∞ for
any eavesdropper channel matrix.
In summary, we have shown that for any eavesdropper, with the same codebook C, we always
have
lim
n→∞
1
n
I
(
W ; Y˜nγ
)
= 0 (194)
The convergence is uniform over all possible values of the eavesdropper channel states.
The reliability requirement (5) is fulfilled by (172).
The average power constraint (4) is guaranteed by the way the codebook ensemble is con-
structed.
Remark 10: The secrecy rate found (189) is identical to the rate we derived with strong
secrecy requirement in (100).
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G. Converse for Corollary 1
In this section, we establish the result in Corollary 1, by providing the converse for the high
SNR characterization of the secrecy rate found in (161).
Since H˜ can be arbitrary, when NE ≥ NT , we can choose H˜ as [INT×NT , 0NT×(NE−NT )]T . The
eavesdropper in this case has perfect knowledge of the transmitted signal. Clearly, the secrecy
capacity is 0.
We next consider the case when NE < NT . We use Xji to denote the ith to the jth component
in a vector X. The secrecy rate is upper bounded by [4]:
I
(
X;Y|Y˜
)
(195)
When NT ≥ NR, we assume H = [DNR×NR, 0NR×(NT−NR)] for a diagonal matrix DNR×NR5.
Since H˜ is arbitrary, we choose H˜ as [INE×NE , 0NE×(NT−NE)]. Then (195) equals:
I
(
X;DNR×NRX
NR
1 + Z|XNE1
) (196)
=I
(
XNR1 , X
NT
NR+1
;DNR×NRX
NR
1 + Z|XNE1
) (197)
=I
(
XNR1 ;DNR×NRX
NR
1 + Z|XNE1
)
+ I
(
XNTNR+1;DNR×NRX
NR
1 + Z|XNE1 , XNR1
) (198)
=I
(
XNR1 ;DNR×NRX
NR
1 + Z|XNE1
) (199)
When NT < NR, we assume H = [DNT×NT , 0NT×(NR−NT )]T for a diagonal matrix DNT×NT .
We use the same H˜ as we did in the previous case. Then (195) equals:
I
(
X;DNT×NTX
NT
1 + Z
NT
1 , Z
NR
NT+1
|XNE1
) (200)
=I
(
X;DNT×NTX
NT
1 + Z
NT
1 |XNE1
)
+ I
(
X;ZNRNT+1|DNT×NTXNT1 + ZNT1 , XNE1
) (201)
=I
(
X;DNT×NTX
NT
1 + Z
NT
1 |XNE1
) (202)
Define Nm = min{NT , NR}. Then, in both cases, (195) can be written as:
I
(
XNm1 ;DNm×NmX
Nm
1 + Z
Nm
1 |XNE1
) (203)
=I
(
XNm1 ; Y
Nm
1 |XNE1
) (204)
which equals:
I(XNmNE+1; Y
Nm
1 |XNE1 ) (205)
5Else, we can perform SVD on H and transform it into this form.
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=h(Y NmNE+1|XNE1 ) + h(Y NE1 |XNE1 , Y NmNE+1)− h(Y Nm1 |XNm1 ) (206)
≤h(Y NmNE+1) + h(Y NE1 |XNE1 , Y NmNE+1)− h(Y Nm1 |XNm1 ) (207)
≤h(Y NmNE+1) + h(Y NE1 |XNE1 )− h(Y Nm1 |XNm1 ) (208)
=h(Y NmNE+1) + h(Z
NE
1 |XNE1 )− h(ZNm1 |XNm1 ) (209)
=h(Y NmNE+1) + h(Z
NE
1 )− h(ZNm1 ) (210)
=h(Y NmNE+1)− h(ZNmNE+1) (211)
=h(Y NmNE+1)− h(Y NmNE+1|XNmNE+1) (212)
=I(XNmNE+1; Y
Nm
NE+1
) (213)
Since we assume H of the original MIMO wiretap channel has a full rank, DNm×Nm also has
full rank. Hence the elements on the diagonal line of D are all positive. This means equation
(213) increases at a rate of O((min{NT , NR}−NE)C(P¯ )). Hence we have proved the converse
of Corollary 1.
V. EXTENSION TO THE MIMO MAC WIRETAP CHANNEL AND THE MIMO BROADCAST
WIRETAP CHANNEL
In this Section, we extend our results to secure communication in multiuser MIMO channels
with arbitrarily varying eavesdropper channel states. In particular, Theorems 2 and 3 are proved
next.
We first prove Theorem 2 for the MIMO MAC-WT. We observe that the secrecy rate region
in (26) is achieved by time sharing, i.e., letting user 1 transmit during α fraction of the channel
uses alone, and user 2 for the remaining channel uses. The region then readily follows from
Theorem 1. The achievability of the s.d.o.f. region follows from the achievable secrecy rate
region (26), by letting P1 = P2 = P →∞.
For the converse, we simply combine the two transmitters. The channel then becomes a
single-user MIMO wiretap channel, where the transmitter has 2NT antennas, the receiver has
NT antennas, and the eavesdropper has NE antenna. d1 + d2 ≤ max{NT −NE, 0} then follows
from the converse of Corollary 1.
We next prove Theorem 3 for the MIMO BC-WT. Again we first obtain an achievable secrecy
rate region by time sharing. The secrecy rates achieved by receivers 1 and 2 are found to be (27)
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as a consequence of Theorem 1. The achieved s.d.o.f. region then follows from the achievable
secrecy rate region (27), by letting P1 = P2 = P →∞.
For the converse, we simply combine the two receivers. The channel then becomes a single-
user MIMO wiretap channel, where the transmitter has NT antennas, the receiver has 2NT
antennas, and the eavesdropper has NE antenna. d1+d2 ≤ max{NT −NE , 0} then follows from
the converse of Corollary 1.
VI. DISCUSSION
A. Methods of Proving Strong Secrecy
As we have mentioned in Section I, it is common practice to prove weak secrecy results
and use privacy amplification [25] to arrive at strong secrecy with identical rates. Since this
work deviates from that approach, and derives the strong secrecy rate directly, it is instructive
to discuss the reason behind it.
Given a weak secrecy coding scheme that spans over n channel uses, reference [25] considers
an equivalent channel for which every n inputs to the weak secrecy scheme is viewed as a single
input to the equivalent channel. It then designs a strong secrecy scheme for this equivalent
channel. If this approach were followed here, then the arbitrarily varying channel would be
encapsulated inside a universal weak secrecy coding scheme to form the equivalent channel.
However, this does not change the fact that the equivalent channel still has an arbitrarily varying
joint distribution for its inputs and outputs. It can be shown that the resulting coding scheme does
satisfy the strong secrecy constraint in (9) for all possible eavesdropper channel state sequences.
However, the convergence speed of the limit in (9) is not uniform over these sequences. Due to
this subtlety, the approach of [25] cannot not be used to prove strong secrecy in this work.
B. Comparison with Related Work
In this section, we provide a detailed discussion of the differences of this work from previous
work that considered settings similar or related to ours. These are:
• Reference [23]: This reference considered the MISO wiretap channel, and claimed that, with
a certain probability, a positive weak secrecy rate can be guaranteed by introducing artificial
noise at the transmitter, even if the transmitter has no knowledge about the eavesdropper
channel states. However, as pointed out in [24], a universal coding scheme is necessary for
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this claim to be correct. In this work, we proved the existence of such a universal coding
scheme.
• References [33] and [27]: The possibility of using information spectrum [34] to prove coding
theorems for wiretap channels was first suggested in [33]. Recently [27] provided a more
detailed proof based on this. The proof of [27] can be easily extended to the case of having
a finite number of eavesdroppers, i.e., the compound setting. However, in this work, we have
to consider infinitely possibilities for eavesdropper channel state sequences. This makes the
proof in this work differs from [27] in the following aspects:
1) To prove the results in [27], it is sufficient to prove that the left hand side of (72)
converges to zero as n goes to ∞. Here, we must prove it converges exponentially
fast to zero with respect to n, as otherwise, the existence of universal secure coding
scheme does not follow.
2) In order to use the approximation argument from [35], we need a uniform upper bound
on the average power of each codeword in the codebook. This was used in obtaining
(88) from (87). To obtain such a bound, we have to sample from a truncated n-letter
Gaussian distribution, as shown in (46) and (48), which complicates the analysis of
the information density. In contrast, in the setting of [27], it is sufficient to sample
from a single letter Gaussian distribution.
The model considered by [27] is also inherently different from the model considered in this
work in the sense that the sequences of eavesdropper channel states in [27] must have a
well-defined n letter distribution. We do not have this restriction in this work.
• Reference [24]: Recently, [24] considered a general arbitrarily varying discrete memoryless
wiretap channel and proved the existence of a universal coding scheme for this channel for
weak secrecy. This work differs from [24] in that we consider a Gaussian model, whose
inputs and outputs are continuous and we prove strong secrecy. We stress that for the
arbitrarily varying channel setting [38], the analysis for continuous alphabets do not follow
from its discrete counterpart with finite alphabets [24, Lemma 3, Lemma 4]. Thus, care
must be exercised in establishing the results from scratch as evidenced by Section IV.
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VII. CONCLUSION
In this work, we have considered secure communication in the presence of eavesdroppers
whose channels are unknown to the legitimate parties and can be arbitrarily varying. We have
shown that multiple antennas used in conjunction with the universal coding scheme presented
in this paper can guarantee positive secrecy rates irrespective of the channels of the (possibly
infinite numbers of) eavesdroppers.
We have derived achievable secrecy rates for the MIMO wiretap channel, and achievable
secrecy rate regions for the MIMO MAC wiretap channel and the MIMO broadcast wiretap
channel where each transmitter(s) and the intended receiver(s) have the same number of antennas.
We have also derived the secure degrees of freedom, and the secure degrees of freedom regions
for these channels by matching the converse to the achievable rates in high SNR. These results
are guaranteed in the most stringent setting, that is in the sense of strong secrecy, which coincides
with the results derived when the notion of weak secrecy is used and the eavesdropper’s channel
gain is assumed to be static.
As future work, it is of interest to consider MIMO MAC and MIMO BC wiretap channels with
asymmetric number of antennas, for which a time sharing scheme is unlikely to be optimal. In
this work, we considered the case where conditioned on a given sequence of channel states, the
eavesdropper channel is memoryless. The corresponding channel model with memory deserves
further investigation.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF LEMMA 2
The second term in (63) can be bounded as:∫
|fγ,Y˜nG (z
n)− fγ,Y˜nT (z
n) (zn) |dzn (214)
≤
∫
|
∫
fγ,Y˜nG|X˜nG (z
n|xn) f
X˜nG
(xn) dxn −
∫
fγ,Y˜nT |X˜nT (z
n|xn) fXnT (xn)dxn|dzn (215)
=
∫
|
∫
fγ,Y˜n
G
|X˜n
G
(zn|xn) f
X˜n
G
(xn) dxn −
∫
fγ,Y˜n
G
|X˜n
G
(zn|xn) fXnT (xn)dxn|dzn (216)
≤
∫ ∫
fγ,Y˜nG|X˜nG (z
n|xn) |f
X˜nG
(xn)− fXn
T
(xn) |dxndzn (217)
=
∫ ∫
fγ,Y˜nG−H˜nX˜nG
(
zn − H˜nxn
)
|f
X˜nG
(xn)− fXnT (xn) |dxndzn (218)
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Let un = zn − H˜nxn. Then (218) equals:6∫ ∫
fγ,Y˜nG−H˜nX˜nG (u
n) |f
X˜nG
(xn)− fXnT (xn) |dxndun (219)
=
∫
fγ,Y˜nG−H˜nX˜nG (u
n)
∫
|f
X˜nG
(xn)− fXnT (xn) |dxndun (220)
For the innermost integral in (220), we can write:∫
|f
X˜nG
(xn)− fXnT (xn) |dxn (221)
=
∫
1
n
‖xn‖2>P
|f
X˜nG
(xn)− fXnT (xn) |dxn +
∫
1
n
‖xn‖2<P
|f
X˜nG
(xn)− fXnT (xn) |dxn (222)
≤
∫
1
n
‖xn‖2>P
f
X˜nG
(xn) dxn +
∫
1
n
‖xn‖2>P
fXnT (x
n) dxn
+
∫
1
n
‖xn‖2<P
|f
X˜nG
(xn)− fXnT (xn) |dxn (223)
≤(1− µn,εP ) +
∫
1
n
‖x‖2<P
|f
X˜n
G
(xn)− µ−1n,εP fX˜nG (x
n) |dxn (224)
≤(1− µn,εP ) + µ−1n,εP − 1 (225)
=µ−1n,εP − µn,εP (226)
From (49), we can choose sufficiently large n, such that µn,εP > 1/2. For such n, we have
µ−1n,εP − µn,εP (227)
=µ−1n,εP
(
1− µ2n,εP
) (228)
≤2 (1− µ2n,εP ) (229)
=2 (1− µn,εP ) (1 + µn,εP ) (230)
≤4 (1− µn,εP ) (231)
Therefore (220) is upper bounded by 4e−nα(εP ). This concludes the proof of the lemma.
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF (66)
Recall that EB[A] denotes the expectation of A averaged over B. Define L = 2n(I(X˜;Y˜)+δn).
Recall that xni,j denotes the codeword in the codebook C that is labeled with (i, j). Since (i, j)
6It is easy to verify that the absolute value of the Jacobian determinant is 1 in this case.
HE AND YENER, SUBMITTED TO IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON INFORMATION THEORY 43
are uniformly distributed, we have:
EC
[∑
w
pW (w)
∫
|fγ,Y˜nG (z
n)− fγ,Y˜n
C
|W (z
n|w) |dzn
]
(232)
=EC
[∑
w
pW (w)
∫
|fγ,Y˜nG (z
n)− 1
L
L∑
j=1
fγ,Y˜n
C
|X˜n
C
(
zn|xnw,j
)|dzn
]
(233)
=
∑
w
pW (w)
∫ L∏
j=1
f
X˜nT
(
xnw,j
) ∫ |fγ,Y˜nG (zn)− 1L
L∑
j=1
fγ,Y˜n
C
|X˜n
C
(
zn|xnw,j
)|dzndxnw,j,j=1...L
(234)
=
∑
w
pW (w)
∫ L∏
j=1
f
X˜n
T
(
xn1,j
) ∫ |fγ,Y˜n
G
(zn)− 1
L
L∑
j=1
fγ,Y˜n
C
|X˜n
C
(
zn|xn1,j
)|dzndxn1,j,j=1...L (235)
=
∫ L∏
j=1
f
X˜nT
(
xn1,j
) ∫ |fγ,Y˜nG (zn)− 1L
L∑
j=1
fγ,Y˜n
C
|X˜n
C
(
zn|xn1,j
)|dzndxn1,j,j=1...L (236)
=EC
[∫
|fγ,Y˜nG (z
n)− 1
L
L∑
j=1
fγ,Y˜n
C
|X˜n
C
(
zn|xn1,j
)|dzn
]
(237)
=EC
[∫
|fγ,Y˜nG (z
n)− fγ,Y˜n
C
|W (z
n|1) |dzn
]
(238)
which is (66).
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF LEMMA 4
Let M be the number of codewords in each bin in the codebook:
M = 2n(I(X˜G;Y˜G)+δn) (239)
As in [34, Proof of Theorem 4], we begin by defining random variables X˜n, X˜n1 , ..., X˜nM and
Y˜
n such that
1) The distribution of X˜n is also given by Q
X˜n
.
2) The distribution of Y˜n conditioned on X˜n is determined by the eavesdropper channel.
3) X˜n1 , ..., X˜nM are i.i.d. and the distribution of X˜nj , j = 1, ...,M is given by QX˜n . X˜n1 , ..., X˜nM
are independent from Y˜n.
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Then, we have [34, Proof of Theorem 4, (4.2)]:
EC

Pr

log fγ,Y˜nC |W
(
Y˜
n
C |1
)
fγ,Y˜nG
(
Y˜nC
) > µn



 (240)
≤Pr
[
1
M
2
iγ,X˜n
G
Y˜n
G
(X˜n,Y˜n)
> τn
]
+ Pr
[
1
M
M∑
j=1
2
iγ,X˜n
G
Y˜n
G
(X˜nj ,Y˜n) > c2,n + τn
]
(241)
where c2,n and τn > 0 satisfy
2τn + c2,n = 2
µn (242)
The values of c2,n and τn will be specified later.
Let 1{a > b} denote the indicator function that equals 1 if a > b, 0 otherwise. For the first
term in (241), we can write:
Pr
[
1
M
2
i
γ,X˜n
G
Y˜n
G
(X˜n,Y˜n)
> τn
]
(243)
=
∫
f
X˜n
(xn) fγ,Y˜n|X˜n (y
n|xn) 1
{
1
M
2
i
γ,X˜n
G
Y˜
n
G
(xn,yn)
> τn
}
dxndyn (244)
≤µ−1n,εP
∫
f
X˜nG
(xn) fγ,Y˜nG|X˜nG (y
n|xn) 1
{
1
M
2
i
γ,X˜n
G
Y˜n
G
(xn,yn)
> τn
}
dxndyn (245)
≤µ−1n,εP Pr
[
1
M
2
iγ,X˜n
G
Y˜n
G
(X˜nG,Y˜nG) > τn
]
(246)
=µ−1n,εP Pr
[
1
n
iγ,X˜nGY˜nG
(
X˜
n
G, Y˜
n
G
)
> I
(
X˜G; Y˜G
)
+ δn +
1
n
log2 τn
]
(247)
For the second term in (241), we follow [34, (4.4),(4.5)] and define the following random
variables conditioned on Y˜n = yn:
Vn,j (y
n) = 2
i
γ,X˜n
G
Y˜
n
G
(X˜nj ,yn) (248)
Zn,j (y
n) = Vn,j (y
n) 1 {Vn,j (yn) ≤M} (249)
UM (y
n) =
1
M
M∑
j=1
Vn,j (y
n) (250)
TM (y
n) =
1
M
M∑
j=1
Zn,j (y
n) (251)
With these notations, as in [34, (4.6)], we can write:
Pr
[
1
M
M∑
j=1
2
i
γ,X˜n
G
Y˜n
G
(X˜n,Y˜n)
> c2,n + τn|Y˜n = yn
]
(252)
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=Pr [UM (y
n) > c2,n + τn] (253)
≤Pr (TM (yn) 6= UM (yn)) + Pr (TM (yn) > c2,n + τn) (254)
For the first term in (254), we can write [34]:
Pr (TM (y
n) 6= UM (yn)) (255)
≤
M∑
j=1
Pr [Zn,j (y
n) 6= Vn,j (yn)] (256)
=M Pr [Vn,1 (y
n) > M ] (257)
(257) can be upper bounded as:
M
[
Pr
[
Vn,1
(
Y˜
n
)
> M
]]
(258)
=M
[
Pr
[
2
i
γ,X˜n
G
Y˜n
G
(X˜n,Y˜n)
> M
]]
(259)
=M
∫
f
X˜n
(xn) fγ,Y˜n|X˜n (z
n|xn)1
{
2
i
γ,X˜n
G
Y˜n
G
(xn,zn)
> M
}
dxndzn (260)
≤µ−1n,εPM
∫
f
X˜nG
(xn) fγ,Y˜nG|X˜nG (z
n|xn)1
{
2
i
γ,X˜n
G
Y˜
n
G
(xn,zn)
> M
}
dxndzn (261)
As shown in [34, Proof of Theorem 4], (261) is upper bounded by:
µ−1n,εP Pr
[
1
n
iγ,X˜nGY˜nG
(
X˜
n
G, Y˜
n
G
)
> I
(
X˜G; Y˜G
)
+ δn
]
(262)
This means
Pr
(
TM
(
Y˜
n
)
6= UM
(
Y˜
n
))
(263)
≤µ−1n,εP Pr
[
1
n
iγ,X˜nGY˜nG
(
X˜
n
G, Y˜
n
G
)
> I
(
X˜G; Y˜G
)
+ δn
]
(264)
For the second term in (254), we can write [34, (4.7)]:
E [TM (y
n)] = E [Zn,1 (y
n)] =
∫
f
X˜n
(xn) 2
i
γ,X˜n
G
Y˜n
G
(xn,yn)
1
{
2
i
γ,X˜n
G
Y˜n
G
(xn,yn) ≤M
}
dxn (265)
≤µ−1n,εP
∫
f
X˜nG
(xn) 2
i
γ,X˜n
G
Y˜n
G
(xn,yn)
1
{
2
i
γ,X˜n
G
Y˜n
G
(xn,yn) ≤M
}
dxn (266)
≤µ−1n,εP (267)
We choose c2,n as
c2,n = µ
−1
n,εp (268)
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Then, following [34, (4.8)], we have
Pr (TM (y
n) > c2,n + τn) ≤ Pr (TM (yn)− E [TM (yn)] > τn) (269)
≤ 1
τ 2n
var (TM (y
n)) (270)
≤ 1
τ 2n
E
[
1
M
Z2n,1 (y
n)
]
(271)
The expectation in (271) can be upper bounded by:
E
[
1
M
Z2n,1 (y
n)
]
=
1
M
∫
f
X˜n
(xn) fγ,Y˜n|X˜n (y
n|xn)Z2n,1 (yn) dxndyn (272)
=
1
M
∫
f
X˜n
(xn) fγ,Y˜n|X˜n (y
n|xn) (Vn,1 (yn) 1 {Vn,1 (yn) ≤M})2dxndyn (273)
=
1
M
∫
f
X˜n
(xn) fγ,Y˜n|X˜n (y
n|xn) (2iγ,X˜nGY˜nG (xn,yn)1
{
2
iγ,X˜n
G
Y˜n
G
(xn,yn)≤M}
)2dxndyn (274)
≤µ−1n,εP
1
M
∫
f
X˜nG
(xn) fγ,Y˜nG|X˜nG (y
n|xn) (2iγ,X˜nGY˜nG (xn,yn)1
{
2
i
γ,X˜n
G
Y˜n
G
(xn,yn)≤M}
)2dxndyn (275)
As illustrated in [34, Proof of Theorem 4,], equation (275) is upper bounded by:
µ−1n,εP {2−n
δn
2 + Pr
[
1
n
iγ,X˜n
G
Y˜n
G
(
X˜
n
G, Y˜
n
G
)
> I
(
X˜G; Y˜G
)
+
δn
2
]
} (276)
This means
Pr
(
TM
(
Y˜
n
)
> c2,n + τn
)
(277)
≤µ
−1
n,εP
τ 2n
{2−n δn2 + Pr
[
1
n
iγ,X˜nGY˜nG
(
X˜
n
G, Y˜
n
G
)
> I
(
X˜G; Y˜G
)
+
δn
2
]
} (278)
Substituting (263)-(264) and (277)-(278) to (252)-(254), we observe:
Pr
[
1
M
M∑
j=1
2
iγ,X˜n
G
Y˜n
G
(X˜n,Y˜n)
> c2,n + τn
]
(279)
≤µ−1n,εP Pr
[
1
n
iγ,X˜n
G
Y˜n
G
(
X˜
n
G, Y˜
n
G
)
> I
(
X˜G; Y˜G
)
+ δn
]
+
µ−1n,εP
τ 2n
{2−n δn2 + Pr
[
1
n
iγ,X˜nGY˜nG
(
X˜
n
G, Y˜
n
G
)
> I
(
X˜G; Y˜G
)
+
δn
2
]
} (280)
Applying this result along with (243)-(247) to (240)-(241), we obtain Lemma 4.
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APPENDIX D
PROOF OF LEMMA 5
Define P ′ as
P ′ =
P (1− εP )
NT
+ 1 (281)
We prove Lemma 5 when H˜n is a sequence such that H˜(i) is given by (36). The case where
H˜(i) is invariant with respect to i is a special case, and does not require a separate proof.
We begin with:
n∏
i=1
fγ,Y˜|X˜
(
Y˜i|X˜i
)
=
1
(π)nNE
exp
(
−
∥∥∥Y˜n − H˜nX˜n∥∥∥2) (282)
where we used the notation in (32). Note that with the distribution we choose for X˜nG and the
channel matrix sequence H˜n given by (36), Y˜nG is a rotationally invariant complex Gaussian
random vector with zero mean and covariance matrix P ′I:
fγ,Y˜nG
(
Y˜
n
)
=
1
(πP ′)nNE
exp

−
∥∥∥Y˜n∥∥∥2
P ′

 (283)
Therefore
1
n
iγ,X˜n
G
Y˜n
G
(
X˜
n
G, Y˜
n
G
)
=NE log2 (P
′) + { 1
n


∥∥∥Y˜nG∥∥∥2
P ′

− 1
n
(∥∥∥Y˜nG − H˜nX˜nG∥∥∥2
)
} log2 e (284)
Define N˜n as
N˜
n = Y˜nG − H˜nX˜nG (285)
For a fixed positive constant ε2, we have:
Pr(
1
n
iγ,X˜n
G
Y˜n
G
(X˜nG, Y˜
n
G) > I(X˜G; Y˜G) + δn) (286)
=Pr(NE log2(P
′) + { 1
n
(
∥∥∥Y˜nG∥∥∥2
P ′
)− 1
n
∥∥∥N˜n∥∥∥2} log2 e > I(X˜G; Y˜G) + δn) (287)
=Pr(NE log2(P
′) +
log2 e
n
(
∥∥∥Y˜nG∥∥∥2
P ′
) > I(X˜G; Y˜G) +
log2 e
n
∥∥∥N˜n∥∥∥2 + δn) (288)
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≤Pr( 1
n
∥∥∥N˜n∥∥∥2 < NE(1− ε2)) + Pr( 1
n
∥∥∥N˜n∥∥∥2 ≥ NE(1− ε2))
Pr(NE log2(P
′) +
log2 e
n
(
∥∥∥Y˜nG∥∥∥2
P ′
) > I(X˜G; Y˜G)+
log2 e
n
∥∥∥N˜n∥∥∥2 + δn
∣∣∣∣1n
∥∥∥N˜n∥∥∥2 ≥ NE(1− ε2)) (289)
≤Pr( 1
n
∥∥∥N˜n∥∥∥2 < NE(1− ε2))
+ Pr(NE log2(P
′) +
log2 e
n
(
∥∥∥Y˜nG∥∥∥2
P ′
) > I(X˜G; Y˜G) + (log2 e)NE(1− ε2) + δn∣∣∣∣ 1n
∥∥∥N˜n∥∥∥2 ≥ NE(1− ε2)) (290)
=Pr(
1
n
∥∥∥N˜n∥∥∥2 < NE(1− ε2))
+ Pr(NE log2(P
′) +
log2 e
n
(
∥∥∥Y˜nG∥∥∥2
P ′
) > I(X˜G; Y˜G) + (log2 e)NE(1− ε2) + δn) (291)
Note that N˜n is a zero mean Gaussian random vector whose covariance matrix is I. Hence, from
[32, (B1)], there exists α(ε2), such that
Pr(
1
nNE
∥∥∥N˜n∥∥∥2 < 1− ε2) < e−nα(ε2) (292)
In addition, note that
I(X˜G; Y˜G)−NE log2 (P ′) (293)
= NE log2(1 +
P (1− εP )
NT
)−NE log2(1 +
P (1− εP )
NT
) = 0 (294)
Hence, the second term in (291) can be written as:
Pr(
1
n
∥∥∥Y˜nG∥∥∥2
P ′
> NE(1− ε2) + δn
log2 e
) = Pr(
1
nNE
∥∥∥∥∥ Y˜
n
G√
P ′
∥∥∥∥∥
2
> 1− ε2 + δn
NE log2 e
) (295)
Each component of Y˜
n
G√
P ′
is a rotationally invariant zero mean complex Gaussian random variable
with unit variance, regardless of the value of H˜n and these components are independent.
Therefore, for ε3 > 0, we have: if for all n, 1 − ε2 + δnNE log2 e ≥ 1 + ε3, i.e., δn ≥ NE(ε3 +
ε2) log2 e, there must exist α(ε3), such that [32, (B2)]:
Pr

 1
nNE
∥∥∥∥∥ Y˜
n
G√
P ′
∥∥∥∥∥
2
> 1− ε2 + δn
NE log2 e

 < e−nα(ε3) (296)
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We have obtained an exponential bound on both terms of (291). Finally, we let ε2 = ε3 and
ε = 2NEε2 log2 e. Hence δn ≥ ε, and we obtain Lemma 5.
APPENDIX E
PROOF OF LEMMA 6
Combining (242) and (268), we have:
τn =
eµn ln 2 − µ−1n,εp
2
(297)
Since µn > 0, we find that (297) is lower bounded by:
µn ln 2 + 1− µ−1n,εp
2
(298)
From (49), we can choose a sufficiently large n such that µn,εp > 1/2. This means µ−1n,εp < 2.
Since from (49), 1− µn,εP ≤ e−nα(εP ), we have
µ−1n,εp − 1 < 2e−nα(εP ) (299)
Applying (299) to (298), we have
τn ≥ µn ln 2− 2e
−nα(εP )
2
(300)
The remainder of the proof entails finding an upper bound for (71), which will lead to an
upper bound on (74) via Lemma 3. (71) can be bounded using Lemma 5 if its conditions are
satisfied. This means that, for a given ε > 0, we require the following three conditions to be
satisfied for all n.
δn
2
≥ ε (301)
δn +
1
n
log2 τn ≥ ε (302)
τn > 0 (303)
Suppose all three conditions are fulfilled, then the three terms in (71) can be bounded as follows.
The third term, as shown in Lemma 5 and using (297)-(298), can be bounded as
1
τ 2n
(
Pr
[
1
n
iγ,X˜nGY˜nG
(
X˜
n
G, Y˜
n
G
)
> I
(
X˜G; Y˜G
)
+
δn
2
]
+ 2−nδn/2
)
(304)
≤ 4
(µn ln 2 + 1− µ−1n,εp)2
(e−nα
′(ε) + 2−nδn/2) (305)
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On the other hand, if (301)-(303) hold, the first two terms in Lemma 4 are all bounded by
e−nα
′(ε)
. Therefore, from Lemma 4, we find
EC

Pr

log2 fγ,Y˜nC |W
(
Y˜
n
C |1
)
fγ,Y˜n
G
(
Y˜nC
) > µn



 (306)
≤µ−1n,εp{2e−nα
′(ε) +
4
(µn ln 2 + 1− µ−1n,εp)2
(e−nα
′(ε) + 2−nδn/2)} (307)
Then, from Lemma 3, we have
EC
[∫
zn
|fγ,Y˜nG (z
n)− fγ,Y˜n
C
|W (z
n|1) |dzn
]
(308)
≤ 2
log2 e
µn + 2µ
−1
n,εp(2e
−nα′(ε) +
4
(µn ln 2 + 1− µ−1n,εp)2
(e−nα
′(ε) + 2−nδn/2)) (309)
From Lemma 2, we have∫
|fγ,Y˜nG (z
n)− fγ,Y˜nT (z
n) |dzn < 4e−nα(εP ) (310)
Finally, from Lemma 1, we have
EC [dγ,C] ≤ EC [2
∑
w
pW (w)
∫
zn
|fγ,Y˜n
T
(zn)− fγ,Y˜n
C
|W (z
n|w) |dzn] (311)
≤EC [2
∑
w
pW (w)
∫
zn
|fγ,Y˜nG (z
n)− fγ,Y˜n
C
|W (z
n|w) |dzn]
+ 2
∫
|fγ,Y˜nG (z
n)− fγ,Y˜nT (z
n) |dzn (312)
≤ 4
log2 e
µn + 4µ
−1
n,εp(2e
−nα′(ε) +
4
(µn ln 2 + 1− µ−1n,εp)2
(e−nα
′(ε) + e−nδn ln 2/2))
+ 8e−nα(εP ) (313)
We then choose δn such that (301)-(303) hold. In order for the bound given by (313) to be
small, we choose µn such that it decreases exponentially fast with respect to n. In order for the
second term in (313) to decrease exponentially fast with respect to n, we can choose
µn = e
−nmin{α′(ε)
4
, δn ln 2
8
,
α(εP )
2
} (314)
The last term inside the minimum, α(εP )/2, is for τn to remain positive, as required by (303).
And as shown by (300), this means for sufficiently large n, whose lower bound only depends
on εP , we have:
τn ≥ 1
4
e−n
α(εP )
2 (315)
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or equivalently:
−1
n
log2 τn ≤
α(εP )
2
log2 e (316)
Hence, we can choose δn such that δn ≥ max{2ε, ε+ α(εP )2 log2 e}, then (301) and (302) hold.
Finally, for the above choices of µn and δn, we note that both (313) and (309) decrease
exponentially fast with respect to n. Hence, we have the two inequalities stated in Lemma 6.
APPENDIX F
PROOF OF LEMMA 7
As we had for Lemma 5, we prove Lemma 7 when H˜n is a sequence such that H˜(i) is given
by (36) and the eavesdropper channel is given by (41).
Let fγ be the conditional p.d.f. of the eavesdropper channel implied by (41) when the channel
matrix sequence is H˜nγ .
When 1
n
∥∥∥Y˜n − H˜nγX˜n∥∥∥2 < r2, for Y˜n = zn and X˜n = xn, we have:
| log fγ (zn|xn)− log fγ′ (zn|xn) | (317)
=|
∥∥∥zn − H˜nγxn∥∥∥2 − ∥∥∥zn − H˜nγ′xn∥∥∥2 | (318)
Recall that ∆nh = H˜nγ − H˜nγ′ and Ai denotes the ith row of matrix A. For a matrix A that has
N rows, let [A1, ...,AN ] denote a row vector formed by concatenating all rows of A. Let 〈x, y〉
denote the inner product operation for the complex vector space. Note that zn is a NE×n matrix
here. Hence (318) can be upper bounded by:
2|Re
NE∑
i=1
〈
zni − H˜nγ,ixn,∆nh,ixn
〉
|+
NE∑
i=1
∥∥∆nh,ixn∥∥2 (319)
≤2|
NE∑
i=1
〈
zni − H˜nγ,ixn,∆nh,ixn
〉
|+
NE∑
i=1
∥∥∆nh,ixn∥∥2 (320)
=2|
〈
[(zn1 − H˜nγ,1xn), ..., (znNE − H˜nγ,NExn)], [∆nh,1xn, ...,∆nh,NExn]
〉
|
+
NE∑
i=1
∥∥∆nh,ixn∥∥2 (321)
≤2
√∥∥∥zn − H˜nγxn∥∥∥2 ‖∆nx‖2 + ‖∆nx‖2 (322)
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where in (322) we use the Cauchy-Schwartz inequality. From (89), we observe that (322) is
upper bounded by:
ng(r, r′) = nr′(2r + r′) (323)
From Lemma 1, (62)-(63) and Lemma 2, we have:
dγ,C ≤ 2
∑
w
pW (w)
∫
|fγ,Y˜nT (z
n)− fγ,Y˜n
C
|W (z
n|w) |dzn (324)
≤ 2
∑
w
pW (w)
∫
|fγ,Y˜nG (z
n)− fγ,Y˜n
C
|W (z
n|w) |dzn + 8e−nα(εP ) (325)
Hence we have obtained (95) in Lemma 7.
Recall that Y˜nG is the signal received by the eavesdropper if X˜n = X˜nG. Since the input
distribution we choose for X˜n is zero mean rotationally invariant Gaussian with covariance
matrix (P (1− εP ))INT×NT , and H˜γ(i) always has the form given by (36) for all γ, we have
fγ,Y˜nG
(zn) = fγ′,Y˜nG
(zn) (326)
Therefore, the first term in (325) can be written as:
2
∑
w
pW (w)
∫
|fγ′,Y˜nG (z
n)− fγ,Y˜n
C
|W (z
n|w) |dzn (327)
≤2
∑
w
pW (w)
∫
|fγ,Y˜n
C
|W (z
n|w)− fγ′,Y˜n
C
|W (z
n|w) |dzn
+ 2
∑
w
pW (w)
∫
|fγ′,Y˜nG (z
n)− fγ′,Y˜n
C
|W (z
n|w) |dzn (328)
Recall that we label each codebook with (i, j). In the encoder, we let W = i, the distribution
over j be pj , which is uniform. We denote the codeword with label (w, j) by xnw,j . Then, each
term inside the sum over w in the first term of (328) can be upper bounded as:∫
|fγ,Y˜n
C
|W (z
n|w)− fγ′,Y˜n
C
|W (z
n|w) |dzn (329)
≤
∑
j
pj
∫
|fγ,Y˜n|X˜n
(
zn|xnw,j
)− fγ′,Y˜n|X˜n (zn|xnw,j) |dzn (330)
The term inside the sum over j can be upper bounded by:∫
|fγ,Y˜n|X˜n
(
zn|xnw,j
)− fγ′,Y˜n|X˜n (zn|xnw,j) |dzn (331)
=
∫
1
n‖zn−H˜nγxnw,j‖2>r2
|fγ,Y˜n|X˜n
(
zn|xnw,j
)− fγ′,Y˜n|X˜n (zn|xnw,j) |dzn
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+
∫
1
n‖zn−H˜nγxnw,j‖2<r2
|fγ,Y˜n|X˜n
(
zn|xnw,j
)− fγ′,Y˜n|X˜n (zn|xnw,j) |dzn (332)
≤
∫
1
n‖zn−H˜nγxnw,j‖2>r2
fγ,Y˜n|X˜n
(
zn|xnw,j
)
dzn +
∫
1
n‖zn−H˜nγxnw,j‖2>r2
fγ′,Y˜n|X˜n
(
zn|xnw,j
)
dzn
+
∫
1
n‖zn−H˜nγxnw,j‖2<r2
|fγ,Y˜n|X˜n
(
zn|xnw,j
)− fγ′,Y˜n|X˜n (zn|xnw,j) |dzn (333)
Note that from the triangular inequality, we have:∥∥∥zn − H˜nγxnw,j∥∥∥ (334)
≤
∥∥∥zn − H˜nγ′xnw,j∥∥∥+ ∥∥∥(H˜nγ′ − H˜nγ)xnw,j∥∥∥ (335)
≤
∥∥∥zn − H˜nγ′xnw,j∥∥∥+ r′√n (336)
The last step follows from (89) and (90).
Therefore 1
n
∥∥∥zn − H˜nγxnw,j∥∥∥2 > r2 implies:
1
n
∥∥∥zn − H˜γ′xnw,j∥∥∥2 > (r − r′)2 (337)
for
r > r′ (338)
This means that (333) is upper bounded by:∫
1
n‖zn−H˜nγxnw,j‖2>r2
fγ,Y˜n|X˜n
(
zn|xnw,j
)
dzn
+
∫
1
n‖zn−H˜γ′xnw,j‖2>(r−r′)2
fγ′,Y˜n|X˜n
(
zn|xnw,j
)
dzn
+
∫
1
n‖zn−H˜nγxnw,j‖2<r2
|fγ,Y˜n|X˜n
(
zn|xnw,j
)− fγ′,Y˜n|X˜n (zn|xnw,j) |dzn (339)
Hence, if r > r′ and
(r − r′)2 ≥ NE(1 + ε) (340)
then (333) can be upper bounded by [32, (B2)]:
2e−nα(ε) +
∫
1
n‖zn−H˜nγxnw,j‖2<r2
|fγ,Y˜n|X˜n
(
zn|xnw,j
)− fγ′,Y˜n|X˜n (zn|xnw,j) |dzn (341)
The second term in (341) can be upper bounded by:∫
1
n‖zn−H˜nγxnw,j‖2<r2
|fγ,Y˜n|X˜n
(
zn|xnw,j
)− fγ′,Y˜n|X˜n (zn|xnw,j) |dzn (342)
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=
∫
1
n‖zn−H˜nγxnw,j‖2<r2
fγ,Y˜n|X˜n
(
zn|xnw,j
) |1− fγ′,Y˜n|X˜n
(
zn|xnw,j
)
fγ,Y˜n|X˜n
(
zn|xnw,j
) |dzn (343)
Recall that when 1
n
∥∥∥zn − H˜nγxnw,j∥∥∥2 < r2, from (319)-(323) we have
1− eng(r,r′) ≤ 1− fγ′,Y˜n|X˜n
(
zn|xnw,j
)
fγ,Y˜n|X˜n
(
zn|xnw,j
) ≤ 1− e−ng(r,r′) (344)
Since g(r, r′) > 0, we have
0 ≤ |1− fγ′,Y˜n|X˜n
(
zn|xnw,j
)
fγ,Y˜n|X˜n
(
zn|xnw,j
) | ≤ max{eng(r,r′) − 1, 1− e−ng(r,r′)} (345)
Note that 1− e−x ≤ 1 when x ≥ 0. And there when 0 ≤ x < 1 ex − 1 ≤ 2x. Hence as long as
ng(r, r′) < 1 (346)
we have (343) upper bounded by:∫
1
n‖zn−H˜nγxnw,j‖2<r2
fγ,Y˜n|X˜n
(
zn|xnw,j
)
2ng (r, r′) dzn (347)
≤2ng (r, r′) (348)
Therefore as long as (338),(340) and (346) are satisfied, (331) is upper bounded by:∫
|fγ,Y˜n|X˜n
(
zn|xnw,j
)− fγ′,Y˜n|X˜n (zn|xnw,j) |dzn
≤2e−nα(ε) + 2ng (r, r′) (349)
Applying this result to (328), we have
2
∑
w
pW (w)
∫
|fγ,Y˜nG (z
n)− fγ,Y˜n
C
|W (z
n|w) |dzn (350)
≤4e−nα(ε) + 4ng (r, r′)
+ 2
∑
w
pW (w)
∫
|fγ′,Y˜nG (z
n)− fγ′,Y˜n
C
|W (z
n|w) |dzn (351)
and, we obtain (96) in Lemma 7.
Since γ′ ∈ SM , we can apply (78)-(79) to γ′, and bound (351) by:
4e−nα(ε) + 4ng (r, r′) + 12(2M + 1)2NTNE exp(−c′n) (352)
Applying this result to (324)-(325), we obtain (97) in Lemma 7.
It remains to check that (338), (340) and (346) are satisfied. This is guaranteed by the
definitions of r and r′ in (90) and (91) and the condition (94) in the Lemma 7. Hence we
have completed the proof of Lemma 7.
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APPENDIX G
PROOF OF LEMMA 10
Consider two eavesdroppers, whose respective channel matrices are given below:
H˜γ = [I, 0]U1 (353)
H˜γ′ = [I, 0]U2 (354)
Let C1 be any codebook from the ensemble {C} described in Section IV-C. Let C2 be
C2 = U2U−11 C1 (355)
= {U2U−11 xn, xn ∈ C1} (356)
Define the probability density function of a codebook, f(C), as
f(C) =
∏
i,j
Q
X˜n
(xni,j) (357)
Since a unitary transform does not change the L2 norm, we have
f(C1) = f(C2) (358)
We also observe from the maximum likelihood decoder (166), that the value of ηγ for a given
codebook C, ηγ(C), only depends on the set H˜γC, which is defined as:
H˜γC = {H˜γxn : xn ∈ C} (359)
Since
H˜γC1 = H˜γ′C2 (360)
We have
ηγ(C1) = ηγ′(C2) (361)
Let U′ = U2U−11 . Let C′ = U′C. Then we have
ηγ =
∫
ηγ (C) f (C) dC (362)
=
∫
ηγ′ (U
′C) f (U′C) dC, (363)
=
∫
ηγ′ (C′) f (C′) dC′ (364)
=ηγ′ (365)
Hence we have proved Lemma 10.
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APPENDIX H
PROOF OF LEMMA 11
Let Y˜i denote the part of Y˜nγ received during the ith channel use. We begin by proving:
n∑
i=1
E
[
‖Y˜i‖2
]
≤ nNE (P + 1) (366)
We have
n∑
i=1
E
[
‖Y˜i‖2
]
(367)
=
n∑
i=1
E
[
‖H˜γX˜i + N˜i‖2
]
(368)
=
n∑
i=1
E
[
‖H˜γX˜i‖2
]
+ E
[
‖N˜i‖2
]
+ 2Re
[
E
[
(H˜γX˜i)
H
N˜i
]]
(369)
Since N˜i is independent from X˜i and N˜i has 0 mean and unit variance, we find that (369)
equals:
n∑
i=1
E
[
‖H˜γX˜i‖2
]
+ E
[
‖N˜i‖2
]
+ 2Re
[
E
[
(H˜γX˜i)
H
]
E
[
N˜i
]]
(370)
=
n∑
i=1
E
[
‖H˜γX˜i‖2
]
+ E
[
‖N˜i‖2
]
(371)
=nNE +
n∑
i=1
E
[
‖H˜γX˜i‖2
]
(372)
Let H˜j be the jth row of H˜γ . Then from (36), we have H˜Hj H˜j = 1. Using this result, we find
that (372) equals:
nNE +
n∑
i=1
NE∑
j=1
E
[
|H˜jX˜i|2
]
(373)
=nNE +
n∑
i=1
NE∑
j=1
E
[
X˜
H
i H˜
H
j H˜jX˜i
]
(374)
=nNE +
n∑
i=1
NE∑
j=1
E
[
|X˜i|2
]
(375)
=nNE +
NE∑
j=1
‖X˜n‖2 (376)
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≤nNE (1 + P ) (377)
The last step follows from the following fact
1
n
‖X˜n‖2 ≤ P, ∀X˜n ∈ C (378)
Note that this is a stronger requirement than the average power constraint, in that it requires
the power of each codeword not to exceed P . This is guaranteed by our codebook construction
described in Section IV-C. Lemma 11 then follows by using the fact that the average power con-
strained random vector achieves the largest differential entropy when it has Gaussian distribution
with i.i.d. components [37].
APPENDIX I
PROOF OF LEMMA 12
Let Bi0,xn be the set of values of Y˜n for which the decoder ϕγ′ outputs xn given the label i0.
Define ηγ |xn be the probability of decoding error for the eavesdropper indexed by γ when the
codeword xn is transmitted. Let Bxn = Bi0,xn with i0 being the i label of xn. Let r2 = 2NE.
Then we have
ηγ|xn =
∫
zn /∈Bxn
fγ (z
n|xn) dzn (379)
≤
∫
‖zn−H˜γxn‖2≥nr2
fγ (z
n|xn) dzn +
∫
‖zn−H˜γxn‖2<nr2
zn /∈Bxn
fγ (z
n|xn) dzn (380)
≤e−nα +
∫
‖zn−H˜γxn‖2<nr2
zn /∈Bxn
fγ (z
n|xn) dzn (381)
Equation (381) follows from [32, (B2)]. Next, we apply (89) and (317)-(322) to the second term
of (381) with r2 = 2NE and (r′)2 = 2NTNEPM2 and find that (381) is upper bounded by
e−nα + eng(r,r
′)
∫
‖zn−H˜γxn‖2<nr2
zn /∈Bxn
fγ′ (z
n|xn) dzn (382)
≤e−nα + eng(r,r′)
∫
zn /∈Bxn
fγ′ (z
n|xn) dzn (383)
Therefore
ηγ ≤ e−nα + eng(r,r′)ηγ′ (384)
≤ e−nα + 5((2M + 1)2NTNE + 1)e−(E¯(δn)−g(r,r′)n (385)
where the last step follows by applying (173). This concludes the proof of Lemma 12.
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